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ABSTRACT 
DOE-owned spent nuclear fuels encompass many fuel types.  In an effort to facilitate criticality analysis 
for these various fuel types, they were categorized into nine characteristic fuel groups with emphasis on 
fuel matrix composition.  Out of each fuel group, a representative fuel type was chosen for analysis as a 
bounding case within that fuel group.  Generally, burnup data, fissile enrichments, and total fuel and 
fissile mass govern the selection of the representative or candidate fuel within that group.  Additionally, 
the criticality analysis will also require data to support design of the canister internals, thermal, and 
radiation shielding.  The purpose of this report is to consolidate and provide in a concise format, material 
and information/data needed to perform supporting analyses to qualify N-Reactor fuels for acceptance 
into the designated repository. 
The N Reactor fuels incorporate zirconium cladding and uranium metal with unique fabrication details in 
terms of physical size, and method of construction.  The fuel construction and post-irradiation handling 
have created attendant issues relative to cladding failure in the underwater storage environment.  These 
fuels were comprised of low-enriched metal (0.947 to 1.25 wt% 235U) that were originally intended to 
generate weapons-grade plutonium for national defense.  Modifications in subsequent fuel design and 
changes in the mode of reactor operation in later years were focused more toward power production. 
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TERMS 
burnup  - is a measure of the amount of fissile material consumed before the fuel element is 
removed from the reactor 
fertile - material, that after neutron capture(s) and decay, becomes fissile 
fissile - materials which will undergo fission with neutrons of any energy 
fissile loading - the amount of fissionable material per unit volume within a fuel pin, assembly, or 
reactor core 
fuel grade - fuel irradiation allowed higher 240Pu content to maximize 239Pu production for use 
in reactor fuels 
fuel handling unit - a method of accounting for distinct parts and pieces of spent nuclear fuels, 
whether rods, plates, assemblies, targets, etc. 
moderator - material/medium in which neutrons from fission reactions are slowed or 
'thermalized' to improve neutron capture by fissile material in the reactor 
weapons grade - fuel irradiation was controlled to minimize 240Pu production relative to 239Pu (< 6% 
of total Pu) 
Zircaloy-2 - an improved zirconium alloy (ASTM grade R60802) with a low nickel composition 
which avoids hydriding and loss of ductility [Ref. 1, p. 324] 
ACRONYMS 
BOL  beginning-of-life 
CSB  Canister Storage Building (Hanford) 
CSER  criticality safety evaluation report 
CVD  Cold Vacuum Drying 
EOL  end-of-life 
DOE  Department of Energy 
FHU  fuel handling unit 
INEEL  Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory 
LEU  low-enriched uranium (always below 5 wt% 235U, but sometimes defined as <2 wt% 
235U) 
MCO  multi-canister overpack 
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MTHM  metric ton heavy metal 
MWd/MTHM megawatt-days/metric ton heavy metal 
PIE  post-irradiation examination 
SFD  Spent Fuel Database 
SNF  spent nuclear fuel 
TBV  to be verified 
WP  waste package 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Hanford Site 
The N Reactor is one of several graphite moderated reactors built at the Department of Energy's (DOE) 
Hanford Site.  Over the years beginning with the Manhattan Project, various reactors were operated 
mainly to produce plutonium for national defense, and to a lesser degree both research and power 
production.  The predominant fuel type in the fuels stored at Hanford consist of those discharged from the 
N Reactor and other miscellaneous reactors. 
Table 1-1.  N-Reactor Fuel Inventories.  [Ref. 2, p. 1] 
 
 Fuel Type  
Quantity
(MTHM)  Storage Location   
 N Reactor  2100.0  105 K-Basins and PUREXa   
 
a.  0.3 MTHM of N Reactor fuel in PUREX canyons; operations have since consolidated these fuels into the K-Basins. 
 
 
2. REACTOR INFORMATION 
The N Reactor core was operated successfully from 1963 to 1987 when the reactor was placed in standby 
status.  In 1965, the reactor had been modified to produce steam for electrical generation as well as its 
original mission - plutonium production.  After two years in standby status, the final core was discharged 
in April 1989.  At full power, the thermal power output of the reactor was 4000 MW.  The reactor was 
also capable of producing 13 million pounds/hr of low-pressure steam to produce 860 MW of electricity.  
[Ref. 2, p. 3] 
The reactor vessel consisted of an 1800-ton graphite block 10 m (33 ft) high, 10 m (33 ft) wide, and 
12 meters (39 ft) long.  Within this block were an array of 1003 horizontal, Zircaloy-2 process tubes that 
held the 366 metric tons of uranium fuel and contained the cooling water.  Reactor controls were provided 
by 84 horizontal, water-cooled rods containing boron.  These rods provided not only the reactivity 
control, but (neutron) flux shaping and emergency shutdown control.  An independent backup emergency 
control shutdown system was provided by 107 vertical channels penetrating the core that could be 
gravity-filled with neutron absorbing material.  [Ref. 2, p. 3] 
 
The N Reactor was designed as a graphite moderated, pressurized-water cooled 'thermal' reactor that 
utilized an LEU fuel cycle to produce Pu-239 for national defense.  The total fuel handling unit (FHU) 
count is ~ 104,000 items.  The total mass of the fuels reported in the Integrated Spent Nuclear Fuel Data 
Base (INSFDB) is shown in Table 2-1. 
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Table 2-1.  N Reactor Fuel Inventories.  [Ref. 2, p. 9] 
 Fuel Location and Type  
Uranium 
MT  
Plutonium
MT  
Total 
MT  
 Weapon grade , Mark IA  39.30  0.02  39.32  
                         , Mark IV  291.90  0.20  292.10  
 Fuel grade       , Mark IA  588.00  1.22  589.22  
                         , Mark IV  1176.30  2.58  1178.88  
 PUREX  0.30  0.00  0.30  
 All N Reactor SNF  2095.80  4.02  2099.82*  
* This number represents a slight discrepancy between this total and the 2100.2 MTHM reported for N-
reactor fuels in the SFD (Appendix A, Table A-1).  Work is underway to resolve these differences. 
3. DOE N REACTOR FUEL INFORMATION 
3.1 Reactor Design Parameters 
3.1.1 N Reactor SNF 
The N Reactor core was fueled with slightly enriched (0.947 wt%, and 0.947 to 1.25 wt% 235U in Mark IV 
or Mark1A fuels respectively [Ref. 2, p. 3]) uranium metal clad in Zircaloy-2.  Differences in the 
enrichment were selected based on the intended mode of reactor operation, i.e. plutonium or power 
production. 
The N Reactor fuel elements consist of the two basic design variants, both of which use two concentric 
tubes of uranium metal co-extruded with Zircaloy-2 cladding.  Lengths and diameters vary slightly by 
fuel type; these differences are described in the following text and shown in Table 3-1.  There is a special 
case of twelve Mark IA fuel assemblies that are the same maximum length as the longest Mark IV fuels, 
i.e. 66.3 cm (26.1-in.) [Ref. 12, pg.1-2] 
The data contained in Table 3-1 is representative of the fuel 'envelope' as it may affect packaging 
strategies. [Ref. 2, p. 6 & Ref. 12, pg. 2-2]. 
3.1.1.1 Mark IV Fuel Details [Ref. 2, p.3] 
Mark IV fuel elements (Figure 3-1) used two concentric tubes of uranium metal co-extruded into Zircaloy 
cladding.  The uranium enrichment for both layers was specified to be 0.947 wt% 235U, yielding an 
average uranium weight of 22.7 kg (50 lb.) per element.  These fuels had an outer diameter of 6.1 cm 
(2.42-in.) and lengths varied (to facilitate reactor fuel loading configurations) as follows: 44, 59, 62, and 
66 cm (17.4, 23.2, 24.6, and 26.1-in.).  The Mark IV fuel element inner and outer assemblies have 
Zircaloy-2 end caps with an axial length of 0.48 cm (0.19-in.) on each end. 
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Table 3-1.  105-N Reactor Fuel Element Description.  [Ref. 2, p. 6] 
  Mark IV  Mark IA 
Pre-irradiation enrichment of 235U  0.947% enriched  0.947-1.25% enriched 
     (inner)  (outer) 
Type-Length Codea         E            S            A             C    M            T             F 
Length,   cm  (in.)  66           62          59          44 
(26.1)     (24.6)     (23.2)     (17.4) 
 53b            50           38 
(20.9)      (19.6)      (14.9) 
Element Diameter, mm (in.)     
   1.  Outer of outer  61.47   (2.42)  60.96   (2.40) 
   2.  Inner of outer  43.18   (1.70)  44.96   (1.77) 
   3.  Outer of inner  32.51   (1.28)  31.75   (1.25) 
   4.  Inner of inner  12.19   (0.48)  11.18   (0.44) 
Cladding weight, kg (lb)     
   1. Outer element  1.094        1.041       0.991       0.791
(2.41)       (2.29)      (2.18)      (1,74)
 0.882     0.832      0.659 
(1.94)    (1.83)     (1.45) 
   2. Inner element  0.550      0.523       0.500       0.400
(1.21)     (1.15)      (1.10)      (0.88) 
 0.536      0.509      0.405 
(1.18)     (1.12)      (0.89) 
Weight of uranium in outer     
   1.  0.947 % 235U,                       kg 
                                                    (lb.) 
 16.0         15.0         14.2         10.5
(35.2)      (33.1)      (31.2)       (23.1)
 - - -          - - -       - - - 
   2.  1.25 % 235U,                         kg   
                                                    (lb.) 
 - - -          - - -         - - -         - - -   11.1        10.4        7.9 
(24.4)      (22.9)    (17.3) 
Uranium isotopics [Ref. 12, pg. 2-2]  (0.947 wt%)  (1.25 wt%) 
235U  0.9470  1.2500 
236U  0.0392  0.0392 
238U  99.0138  98.7108 
Weight of uranium in inner          kg 
@ 0.947 % 235U,                          (lb.) 
 7.5          7.0           6.6           5.0 
(16.5)      (15.5)      (14.6)      (10.9) 
 5.5          5.1         3.9 
(12.1)     (11.3)      (8.6) 
Maximum weight of an element, kg 
                                                     (lb.) 
 25.15      23.65       22.31      16.65
(55.32)    (52.04)    (49.08)    (36.62)
 18.01      16.89     12.8 4 
(39.62)    (37.15)   (28.24) 
Weighted average of uranium in 
element, kg (lb) 
 22.73  (50.0)  16.32  (35.9) 
Ratio of Zircaloy-2 to uranium, 
kg/MT (lb/ton) 
 140         141.6       143.2       154.1  171.0     172.5     180.7 
 
a. Letter code differentiates the various lengths of Mark IV or Mark1A fuel elements, i.e. a type “E” element is 26.1 inches long. 
b. There are twelve Mark IA assemblies that have an overall length of  66.3 cm; they will be dealt with as a special case fuel loading in a 
Mark IV fuel basket. 
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Figure 3-1.  Characteristic N Reactor Fuel Types. (see Table 3-1 for other lengths) [Ref. 2, p. 4]  
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The construction the N-reactor fuel assemblies includes the use of annular cylinders of co-extruded 
uranium with Zircaloy cladding.  This method of construction ultimately lead to concentric tubes filled 
with uranium metal alloy and an inner and outer cladding with attendant end caps.  There is variability in 
the cladding thickness that is dependent not only on which tube is being examined, but which fuel type.   
The accompanying table provides a summary of calculated thickness based on specified dimensions of the 
fuel assemblies. 
Table 3-2. Calculated Cladding Dimensions [Ref. 5, p. 5] 
 
             Mk IV           Mk IA 
        cm (inches)     cm (inches) 
 Outer layer - outer tube  0.0640  (0.0252)  0.0635  (0.0250) 
 Inner layer - outer tube  0.0505  (0.0199)  0.0555  (0.0219) 
 Outer layer - inner tube  0.0765  (0.0301)  0.1015  (0.0400) 
 Inner layer - inner tube  0.0510  (0.0201)  0.0635  (0.0250) 
 End cap thickness  0.4830  (0.1900)  0.4830  (0.1900) 
 
3.1.1.2 Mark IA Fuel Details  [Ref. 2, p.3] 
The Mark IA fuels (Figure 3-1) are differentiated from the Mark IV fuel elements in that the outer 
concentric tube of uranium metal consists of 1.25 wt% enriched in 235U; the inner concentric tube still 
consists of a 0.947 wt% U enrichment.  These fuels have a slightly smaller diameter of 6.1 cm (2.40-in.) 
than the Mark IV fuels, and their U metal weight of 16.3 kg (35.9 lb.) is somewhat less than that found in 
the average Mark IV elements.  Fuel lengths varied by the following values:  38, 50, or 53 cm (14.9, 19.6, 
and 20.9-in.).  An exception to these quoted lengths must include twelve Mark IA assemblies that 
measure 66.3 cm (26.1-in.) long. [Ref. 12]; a separate analysis has analyzed loading these special case 
fuels in a Mark IV basket configuration because of the added length. [Ref. 13 ]   The Mark IA fuel 
element inner and outer assemblies have Zircaloy-2 end caps with an axial length of 0.483 cm (0.190-in.) 
on each end. 
Both Mark IV and Mark IA fuels were co-located in the N reactor during operation, with the more highly-
enriched Mark IA assemblies functioning as the seed or driver fuel. 
3.1.1.3 Fuel Fabrication  [Ref. 2, p. 5] 
The following construction details are common to both types of fuels, regardless of the fuel type.  
Materials selection and fabrication processes were a deciding factor in cladding the elements in 
Zircaloy-2 to protect the uranium metal from the steam environment in the reactor, as well as supporting 
the efficient production of plutonium.   
DOE/SNF/REP-056 May 2000 
Rev. 0 Page 14 of 72 
 
In the co-extrusion fabrication process, each uranium tube was clad in both an inner and outer sleeve of 
Zircaloy-2 with an additional outer sheath of copper.  The assemblies were evacuated and sealed to 
prevent oxidation during preheating and extrusion.  A solid state diffusion bond formed between the 
uranium core and the Zircaloy-2 cladding at the elevated temperatures and pressure experienced during 
the extrusion process.  The extruded fuel was then cut to the desired lengths and a recess was machined 
into the uranium at each end of the fuel section.  Subsequent acid stripping of the copper sheath and acid 
etching to remove residual uranium from the cladding prepared the element for final closure.  The tube 
ends were closed by placing a braze ring made of Zircaloy-2 and 5% beryllium, and a Zircaloy-2 end cap 
in each end of the fuel.  The assembly was then induction heated to brazing temperature (approximately 
1050 °C) in a vacuum.  The junction of the end cap, braze, and cladding was fusion welded to alloy the 
braze material with the cladding to improve corrosion resistance and provide a hermetic seal.  The fuel 
was then heat treated and cleaned with an abrasive grit blast and acid baths. 
Six spacers were welded to the outside of the inner tube to ensure proper alignment and locking with the 
outer tube when the two tubes were assembled together.  Eight Zircaloy-2 support clips were welded to 
the outside of the outer tube to ensure proper alignment of the fuel when inserted into the N Reactor core.  
Low-carbon steel 'shoes' were crimped onto these Zircaloy-2 clips to reduce the effect of their rubbing 
against the reactor tubes during fuel element insertion and removal.  The shoes varied in thickness from 
10 to 18 mils, and added 0.42 to 0.74 grams of iron.  The composition of the components associated with 
the fuel elements and the major/minor chemical constituents are shown in Table 3-3. 
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Table 3-3.  Chemical Composition of N Reactor Fuel Assembly Components.a  [Ref. 2, p. 7] 
 Element  
Uranium Alloy 
601  Zircaloy-2  Braze Filler  
 Aluminum  700–900  75  145  
 Beryllium  10  - - -   4.75–5.25 wt%  
 Boron  0.25  0.5  0.5  
 Cadmium  0.25  0.5  0.5  
 Carbon  365–735  275  500  
 Chromium  65  0.05–0.15 wt%  0.05–0.15 wt%  
 Cobalt  - - -   10  20  
 Copper  75  50  60  
 Hafnium  - - -  200  200  
 Hydrogen  2  25  50  
 Iron   300–400  0.07–0.20 wt%  0.06–0.21 wt%  
 Lead  - - -   100  130  
 Magnesium  25  20  60  
 Manganese  25  50  60  
 Molybdenum  - - -   50  50  
 Nickel  100  0.03–0.08 wt%  0.03–0.08 wt%  
 Nitrogen  75  80  200  
 Oxygen  - - -   - - -   2300  
 Silicon  124  100  250  
 Sodium  - - -   20  20  
 Tin  - - -   1.20–1.70 wt%  1.14–1.70 wt%  
 Titanium  - - -   50  50  
 Tungsten  - - -   50  100  
 Uranium  Balance  3.5  4  
 Vanadium  - - -   50  50  
 Zirconium  65  Balance  Balance  
 
a.  Concentrations given in parts per million (ppm) maximum or ppm range, unless indicated otherwise. 
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3.1.2 Thermal  [Ref. 10, p. 20] 
Fuel Type Safety Basis (see Note 1) Design Basis  
Mark IV 
 
776 watts / MCO (maximum) 
1420 W / 11.6 MTU = 122.4 W/MTU 
Fuel decayed to 5/31/98  
 
270 assembly/MCO x 23.48 kgU/assembly = 6339.6 
kgU/MCO 
122.4 W/MTU * 6339.6 kgU/MCO = 775.96 W/MCO 
403 watts Average 
(includes Mark IV & Mark IA) 
Mark IA 585 watts / MCO (maximum) 
1420 W / 11.6 MTU = 122.4 W/MTU 
Fuel decayed to 12/31/97 = 131.75 W/MTU 
 
288 assembly/MCO x 16.59 kgU/assembly = 4777.92 
kgU/MCO 
122.4 W/MTU * 4777.92 kgU/MCO = 585 W/MCO 
[Total fuel heat generation in the combined basins = 161,000 W 
                                         fuel decayed to 5/31/98]  
 
161,000 W total heat in KE&KW basins   = 403 W/MCO 
400 MCO's (nominal) to be processed 
 
Notes: 1. 5 fuel baskets per MCO represents bounding case for Mark IV fuels, and 6 fuel baskets for Mark IA fuels. 
 
 
 
3.1.3 Burnup Data 
Irradiation times (and burnup) for both Mark IV and Mark IA fuels were determined by whether the 
reactor was being operated for weapons quality Pu (< 6% 240Pu content after irradiation) or predominantly 
for Pu production for power reactors. 
The concentration of radionuclides present in the N Reactor fuel is a function of the original fuel 
composition, irradiation history, and decay time.  Short-lived fission products have decayed to 
insignificant concentrations during the time since the fuel was irradiated.  The radionuclide activity and 
decay heat present in the N Reactor fuel were determined by ORIGEN2 analysis [Ref. 2, pgs.11-13].  The 
activity of radionuclides in Mark IV and 1A fuel with 12% 240Pu content in the plutonium, which exceeds 
five curies per metric ton of initial uranium, is shown in Table 3-5 at 10, 20, and 30 years since 
irradiation.  The activity of radionuclides in Mark IV and Mark IA fuel with 6% 240Pu content is shown in 
Table 3-6 at 5 and 10 years since irradiation.  However, the activity for the fuel with 6% 240Pu content in  
Table 3-4.  Exposure and Time Since Irradiation of 105-N Reactor Fuel.  [Ref. 2, p.10] 
   Fuel  Mark IV  Mark IA  
 Exposure:  12% 240Pu  2268 
MWD/MTUa 
 2730 MWD/MTU  
   6% 240Pu  907 MWD/MTU  1089 MWD/MTU  
 Decay Time:b  Fuel gradec  13–23 years  13–23 years  
   Weapon gradec  7–8 years  7–8 years  
 
a.  MWD/MTU stands for megawatt days per metric ton of initial uranium. 
b.  Time since last irradiation as of 12/93. 
c.  Weapon-grade fuel contains plutonium having approximately 6% 240Pu isotope content or less; fuel-grade fuel contains 
plutonium having a higher 240Pu isotope content. 
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Table 3-5.  Activity of Selected Radionuclides in Mark IA and Mark IV Fuel with 12% 240Pu in the 
Plutonium.a  [Ref. 2, p.11] 
   (Time Since Reactor Discharge)  
   10 Years  20 Years  30 Years  
 Nuclide  Mark IA  Mark IV  Mark IA  Mark 1V  Mark IA  Mark IV  
 3 H  3.08E+01  2.64E+01  1.76E+01  1.51E+01  1.00E+01  8.59E-00  
 55 Fe  8.27E-00  7.64E-00  5.75E-01  5.31 E-01  4.00 E-02  3.69E-02  
 60 Co  6.14E-00  4.92E-00  1.65E-00  1.32E-00  4.42E-01  3.54E-01  
 85 Kr  5.89E+02  4.81E+02  3.09E+02  2.52E+02  1.62E+02  1.32E+02  
 90 Sr  6.80E+03  5.53E+03  5.36E+03  4.35E+03  4.23E+03  3.43E+03  
 90 Y  6.80E+03  5.53E+03  5.36E+03  4.35E+03  4.23E+03  3.43E+03  
 106 Ru  5.56E+01  5.15E+01  5.74E-02  5.31E-02  5.92E-05  5.48E-05  
 106 Rh  5.56E+01  5.15E+01  5.74E-02  5.31E-02  5.92E-05  5.48E-05  
 125 Sb  1.39E+02  1.27E+02  1.13E+01  1.04E+01  9.30E-01  8.50E-01  
 125m Te  3.38E+01  3.90E+01  2.77E-00  2.53E-00  2.27E-01  2.08E-01  
 134 Cs  1.49E+02  1.22E+02  5.17E-00  4.22E-00  1.79E-01  1.46E-01  
 137 Cs  8.39E+03  7.01E+03  6.66E+03  5.57E+03  5.29E+03  4.42E+03  
 137m Ba  7.94E+03  6.64E+03  6.30E+03  5.27E+03  5.00E+03  4.18E+03  
 144 Ce  3.24E+01  2.67E+01  4.40E-03  3.62E-03  5.96E-07  4.91E-07  
 144 Pr  3.24E+01  2.67E+01  4.40E-03  3.62E-03  5.96E-07  4.91E-07  
 147 Pm  2.24E+03  1.88E+03  1.59E+02  1.34E+02  1.14E+01  9.55E-00  
 151 Sm  9.77E+01  8.74E+01  9.05E+01  6.09E+01  8.38E+01  7.49E+01  
 154 Eu  1.00E+02  8.49E+01  4.47E+01  3.79E+01  2.00E+01  1.69E+01  
 155 Eu  3.73E+01  3.42E+01  9.21E-00  8.45E-00  2.28E-00  2.09E-00  
 238 Pu  5.05E+01  4.82E+01  4.66E+01  4.46E+01  4.31E+01  4.12E+01  
 239 Pu  1.10E+02  1.10E+02  1.10E+02  1.10E+02  1.10E+02  1.10E+02  
 240 Pu  5.97E+01  5.77E+01  5.97E+01  5.77E+01  5.96E+01  5.76E+01  
 241 Pu  4.47E+03  4.43E+03  2.76E+03  2.74E+03  1.71E+03  1.69E+03  
 241 Am  9.33E+01  9.26E+01  1.48E+02  1.47E+02  1.81E+02  1.79E+02  
 244 Cm  4.64E-00  4.54E-00  3.17E-00  3.10E-00  2.16E-00  2.11E-00  
               
 Totalb  3.83E+04  3.25E+04  2.75E+04  2.32E+04  2.11E+04  1.78E+04  
 Decay Heatb  1.02E+02  8.57E+01  8.11E+01  6.87E+01  6.71E+01  5.73E+01  
 
a.  Units are curies per MTU, except decay heat is watts per MTU.  Nuclides with activity below 5 curies per assembly are not 
listed. 
b.  Totals include effect of all radionuclides present in one MTU 
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Table 3-6.  Activity of Selected Radionuclides in Mark IV Fuel with 6% 240Pu in the Plutonium and 
Mark IA Fuel with 6% and 16% 240Pu in the Plutonium.a  [Ref. 2, p. 12] 
   (Time Since Reactor Discharge)  
   5 Years   10 Years   
   6.00% 240Pu  6.00% 240Pu  16% 240Pu  
 Nuclide  Mark IA  Mark IV  Mark IA  Mark IV  Mark IA  
 3 H  1.58E+01  1.34E+01  1.19E+01  1.01E+01  4.59E+01  
 55 Fe  1.38E+01  1.27E+01  3.63E-00  3.36E-00  1.22E+01  
 60 Co  4.86E-00  3.89E-00  2.52E-00  2.02E-00  8.78E-00  
 85 Kr  3.50E+02  2.87E+02  2.53E+02  2.08E+02  8.07E+02  
 90 Sr  3.30E+03  2.70E+03  2.93E+03  2.39E+03  9.32E+03  
 90 Y  3.30E+03  2.70E+03  2.93E+03  2.39E+03  9.32E+03  
 106 Ru  5.56E+02  5.12E+02  1.79E+01  1.64E+01  8.52E+01  
 106 Rh  5.56E+02  5.12E+02  1.79E+01  1.64E+01  8.52E+01  
 125 Sb  1.83E+02  1.67E+02  5.25E+01  4.76E+01  2.02E+02  
 125m Te  4.48E+01  4.06E+01  1.28E+01  1.16E+01  4.94E+01  
 134 Cs  1.19E+02  9.63E+01  2.22E+01  1.79E+01  3.01E+02  
 137 Cs  3.76E+03  3.13E+03  3.35E+03  2.79E+03  1.20E+04  
 137m Ba  3.56E+03  2.96E+03  3.17E+03  2.64E+03  1.14E+04  
 144 Ce  1.40E+03  1.16E+03  1.63E+01  1.34E+01  3.97E+01  
 144 Pr  1.40E+03  1.16E+03  1.63E+01  1.35E+01  3.97E+01  
 144m Pr  1.68E+01  1.39E+01  1.96E-01  1.61E-01  4.77E-01  
 147 Pm  4.26E+03  3.55E+03  1.14E+03  9.47E+02  2.72E+03  
 151 Sm  6.52E+01  5.70E+01  6.28E+01  5.49E+01  1.10E+02  
 154 Eu  2.18E+01  1.82E+01  1.46E+01  1.22E+01  2.17E+02  
 155 Eu  4.35E+01  4.02E+01  2.16E+01  2.00E+01  5.14E+01  
 238 Pu  7.49E-00  7.41E-00  7.20E-00  7.12E-00  1.22E+02  
 239 Pu  5.60E+01  5.58E+01  5.60E+01  5.58E+01  1.37E+02  
 240 Pu  1.42E+01  1.42E+01  1.42E+01  1.46E+01  9.99E+01  
 241 Pu  6.54E+02  6.64E+02  5.14E+02  5.22E+02  8.72E+03  
 241 Am  6.00E-00  6.10E-00  1.06E+01  1.08E+01  1.84E+02  
 244 Cm  4.28E-02  4.37E-02  3.54E-02  3.61E-02  2.62E+01  
             
 Totalb  2.37E+04  1.99E+04  1.47E+04  1.22E+04  5.61E+04  
 Decay Heatbb  6.37E+01  5.35E+01  4.03E+01  3.37E+01  1.48E+02  
 
a.  Units are curies per MTU, except decay heat is watts per MTU.  Nuclides with activity below 5 curies per assembly are not 
listed. 
b.  Totals include effect of all radionuclides present in one MTU. 
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Table 3-7.  Mass of Selected Actinides in Mark IA and Mark IV Fuel with 12% 240Pu in the Plutonium.a  
[Ref. 2, p. 13] 
   Time Since Reactor Discharge 
   10 Years  20 Years  30 Years 
 Nuclide  Mark IA  Mark IV  Mark IA  Mark IV  Mark IA  Mark IV
 234 U  7.46E+01  7.45E+01  7.48E+01  7.47E+01  7.50E+01  7.49E+01  
 235 U  8.41E+03  7.04E+03  8.41E+03  7.04E+03  8.41E+03  7.04E+03  
 236 U  9.22E+02  8.14E+02  9.22E+02  8.14E+02  9.22E+02  8.15E+02  
 238 U  9.85E+05  9.87E+05  9.85E+05  9.87E+05  9.85E+05  9.87E+05  
 237 Np  4.11E+01  3.94E+01  4.17E+01  4.00E+01  4.25E+01  4.07E+01  
 239 Pu  1.76E+03  1.77E+03  1.76E+03  1.77E+03  1.76E+03  1.77E+03  
 240 Pu  2.62E+02  2.53E+02  2.62E+02  2.53E+02  2.62E+02  2.53E+02  
 241 Pu  4.33E+01  4.30E+01  2.68E+01  2.66E+01  1.66E+01  1.64E+01  
 241 Am  2.72E+01  2.70E+01  4.32E+01  4.28E+01  5.26E+01  5.22E+01  
 Totalb  9.97E+05  9.97E+05  9.97E+05  9.97E+05  9.97E+05  9.97E+05  
 
a.  Units are grams per metric ton of unirradiated uranium.  Actinides with mass below 10 grams per assembly are not listed. 
b.  Totals include all actinides from one metric ton of unirradiated uranium. 
 
Table 3-8.  Mass of Actinides in Mark IV Fuel with 6% 240Pu in the Plutonium and Mark IA with 6% 
and 16% 240Pu in the Plutonium.a [Ref. 2, p. 13] 
   5 Years Since Discharge  10 Years Since Discharge  
   6% 240Pu  6% 240Pu  16% 240Pu  
 Nuclide  Mark IA  Mark IV  Mark IA  Mark IV  Mark IA  
 234 U  7.45E+01  6.80E+01  7.45E+01  6.80E+01  6.94E+01  
 235 U  1.01E+04  8.35E+03  1.01E+04  8.35E+03  7.39E+03  
 236 U  7.36E+02  6.90E+02  7.36E+02  6.90E+02  1.18E+03  
 238 U  9.87E+05  9.89E+05  9.87E+05  9.89E+05  9.84E+05  
 237 Np  1.59E+01  1.56E+01  1.59E+01  1.56E+01  6.74E+01  
 239 Pu  9.01E+02  8.97E+02  9.01E+02  8.97E+02  2.20E+03  
 240 Pu  6.23E+01  6.25E+01  6.23E+01  6.25E+01  4.38E+02  
 241 Pu  6.34E+00  6.45E+00  4.99E+00  5.07E+00  8.46E+01  
 242 Pu  2.46E-01  2.50E-01  2.46E-01  2.50E-01  1.64E+01  
 241 Am  1.75E+00  1.78E+00  3.09E+00  3.14E+00  5.36E+01  
 Totalb  9.99E+05  9.99E+05  9.99E+05  9.99E+05  9.95E+05  
 
a.  Units are grams per metric ton of unirradiated uranium.  Actinides with mass below 10 grams per assembly are not listed. 
b.  Totals include all actinides from one metric ton of unirradiated uranium. 
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the plutonium is not bounding, as it can be seen to be less than that of the fuel with 12% 240Pu content in 
the plutonium on any desired date, i.e. the 10 and 20 year decayed fuel with 12% 240Pu content in the 
plutonium have greater activity than fuel with 6% 240Pu content in the plutonium decayed for 5 and 10 
years respectively.  Tables 3-7 and 3-8 provide a more detailed breakdown of the N fuel actinide contents. 
3.1.4 Chemical/Physical Properties 
Uranium used in the fabrication of the N Reactor fuels was delivered in billets with specified/allowable 
alloys/impurities in what is otherwise a pure, uranium metal system.  The standard alloy was specified as 
an FEDC Alloy 601 and had the following alloy materials incorporated.   
Table 3-9.  Fuel Billet Alloying Materials. [Ref. 8, p. 2 & 3]  
 Element  Concentration (ppm)
 Iron  280–440a 
 Silicon  60–130 
 Aluminum  650–945a 
a.  Ingots containing both 280 to 300 ppm Fe and 650 to 700 ppm Al shall not be acceptable. 
 
The specified minimum density of the Alloy 601 fuel ingot material was listed as 18.77 grams per cubic 
centimeter.  [Ref. 6, p. I-2]  A 'production' density used in MCNP calculations by Hanford used a value of 
18.82 grams per cubic centimeter. [Ref. 4, p. 5] 
The specified density of the zirconium cladding is 6.55 grams per cubic centimeter.  [Ref. 5, p. 5] 
Table 3-10.  Fuel Billet Allowable Impurities. [Ref. 8, p. 2 & 3]  
 Element  Maximum Concentration (ppm)
 Beryllium  10 
 Boron  0.25 
 Cadmium  0.25 
 Carbon  735 (330 minimum) 
 Chromium  65 
 Copper  75 
 Hydrogen  2 
 Manganese  25 
 Magnesium  25 
 Nickel  100 
 Nitrogena  75 
 Zirconiumb  65 
a.  May be determined by sampling selected ingots on a MIL-STD-414 sampling plan. 
b.  May be determined on a composite of n ingots.  The zirconium content of the composite sample shall not exceed 65/n ppm. 
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3.1.5 Fuel Storage 
Extended storage of the N reactor fuels in an underwater environment has resulted in a degraded or 
damaged condition for much of the fuel over time (detailed in Appendix C).  The sludge at the bottom of 
the fuel storage pools contains some small fraction of the fuel degradation products, but is not included 
for consideration in repository disposal. 
Table 3-11. Chemical Inventory for Both KE and KW Basins [Ref. 10, p. 19] 
Element Uranium Alloy 601 (kg) Zircaloy-2 Cladding 
(kg) 
Braze Filler (kg) Totals (kg)2 
Al 1,480-1,900 11.1 0.411 1,700 
B 0.53 0.074 0.00142 0.605 
Be 21 - - - 142 163 
C 769 - 1,550 40.7 1.42 1,200 
Cd 0.53 0.074 0.00142 0.605 
Co  1.48 0.0567 1.54 
Cr 137 74-222 1.42 - 4.26 288 
Cu 158 7.4 0.17 166 
Fe 632-843 104 - 296 1.70 - 5.96 941 
H 4.22 3.7 0.142 8.06 
Hf  29.6 0.567 30.2 
Hg 52.7 2.96 0.17 55.8 
Mn 52.7 7.4 0.17 60.3 
Mo - - - 7.4 0.142 7.54 
N 158 11.8 0.567 170 
Na - - - 2.96 0.0567 3.02 
Ni 211 44.4 -118 0.851 - 2.27 294 
O - - - - - - 6.53 6.53 
Pb - - - 14.8 0.369 15.2 
Si 261 14.8 0.709 277 
Sn - - - 1,780 - 2,520 32.3 - 48.2 2190 
Ti - - - 7.4 0.142 7.54 
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Table 3-11. Chemical Inventory for Both KE and KW Basins (cont'd) [Ref. 10, p. 19] 
 
 
Actinides Uranium Alloy 601 
(kg) 
Zircaloy-2 Cladding 
(kg) 
Braze Filler (kg) Totals (kg)2 
V - - - 7.4 0.142 7.54 
W - - - 7.4 0.284 7.68 
Zr 753 145,000 2,780 148,000 
U 2,100,000 0.518 0.0113 2,100,000 
Np 81.1 - - - - - - 81.1 
Pu 4,120 - - - - - - 4,120 
Am 109 - - - - - - 109 
Cm 0.018 - - - - - - 0.018 
Fission 
Products 
    
Se 12 - - - - - - 12 
Sr 152 - - - - - - 152 
Tc 170 - - - - - - 170 
Pd 133 - - - - - - 133 
Kr 77.1 - - - - - - 77.1 
I 46.1 - - - - - - 46.1 
Cs 4.65 - - - - - - 4.65 
Pm 0.50 - - - - - - 0.50 
Sm 176 - - - - - - 176 
Xe 1040 - - - - - - 1040 
 
1. For values with a range, the midpoint of the range is used 
For purposes of estimating chemical behavior of a breached package, the various chemical species can be 
apportioned among the number of MCOs that are eventually generated.  The number of MCOs to be 
generated with packaging operations ranges from ~394 (assumes no scrap baskets) to 440 (based on an 
estimation of the number of scrap baskets needed to accommodate damaged fuels). 
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4. MULTI-CANISTER OVERPACK (MCO) 
Development of the MCO grew out of the Tri-Party Agreement between the State of Washington -
Department of Ecology, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), Region 10, and the Department of 
Energy (DOE).  Part of the agreement mandated removal of spent reactor fuels from the wet-storage 
environment in the K-Basins because of the potential environmental concerns posed with continued wet-
storage.   
The MCO was initially developed as an interim dry-storage container for the various N-Reactor fuels.  
With an evolutionary design, it may be also end up being used as the package for transport and disposal in 
the repository. 
Current wet-storage of the N Reactor fuels required a package design that must allow for both underwater 
loading of the fuel elements, and in situ drying of the MCO and its contents after loading. 
One canister design has been proposed for use in the packaging, transport, and disposal of the N Reactor 
fuels [Ref. 8, # Dwg. H-2-828041, Shts 1, 2, & 3, Rev. 0].  The canister design (Figure 4-1) includes a 
nominal length of 4198.37 mm (165.29 -in.) and a maximum outer diameter of 642.9 mm (25.31-in.)  
Beyond these basic dimensions, fuel-specific internals have been designed for each canister based on the 
known maximum lengths of the fuels (Mark IV or IA) contained therein. 
4.1 Multi-Canister Overpack Design Features 
The MCO’s are constructed out of 304L stainless steel having an outside diameter 60.92 cm (23.985-in.) 
and a wall thickness of 1.27 cm (0.5-in.) (Figure 4-1).  The top portion of the MCO has a slightly larger 
diameter of 64.29 cm (25.31-in.) than the overall tube body in order to accommodate the top mechanical 
closure device. [Ref. 9, Dwg. # H-2-828042, Sht 1 of 3, Rev. 2]  The overall length of the MCO is 
422.707 cm (166.42-in.) with an inner cavity height to the top of the stacked baskets of 356.545 cm 
(140.372-in.) [Ref. 9, Dwg. # H-2-828041, Sht 1, Rev. 2].  The bottom plate has a thickness of 5.11 cm 
(2.01-in.) [Ref. 9, Dwg. # H-2-828044, Sht 1, Rev. 2]  There is a metal 'structure' that adds another 57.91 
cm (22.80-in.) to the top of the MCO above the basket that might best be approximated as a solid, 304L 
stainless steel shield plug. [Ref. 9, Dwg. # H-2-828041, Sht 1 of 3, Rev. 2]. 
In addition a central process post constructed out of 304L stainless steel is present in the MCO’s.  This 
central post is associated with the stacked baskets, and each post is drilled to facilitate water removal from 
the bottom of the MCO after underwater loading.  In the case of the Mark IV fuel baskets, the post O.D. is 
7.20 cm (2.835-in.) with a 1.37 cm (0.54-in.) thick wall.  The Mark IA fuel and scrap baskets use a 16.83 
cm (6.625-in.) post diameter and a 4.458 cm (1.755-in.[max.]) drilled hole in the center for a 6.18 cm 
(2.435-in.) wall thickness. 
It is important to distinguish between what constitutes intact versus scrap material when discussing MCO 
basket loading.  The following generic guidelines are to be used for differentiating material segregation 
between baskets. 
Scrap can  ". . .consist of material with a maximum dimension as small as 1/4 inch, but can also consist of 
pieces as large as entire fuel elements which do not fit in bottom plate sockets of the fuel basket." [Ref. 
14, p.12] 
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Figure 4-1.  Multi-Canister Overpack. (depicted w/ 4-intact and 1 scrap Mk IV baskets) [Ref. 9, Dwg. 
H-2-828041, Sht. 1] 
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Figure 4-2.  Example of Loading Arrangements in MCO's [Ref. 9].
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'Intact' fuels, suitable for loading in MCO fuel baskets, are defined as material that is ". . . loaded to form 
fuel element pairs, at least one end of the outer element fits within the hole machined in the plate of the 
fuel basket, and the inner element fits within the outer element.  Both elements must seat within the fuel 
basket holes such that the top of either element does not exceed the fuel basket height.  Fuel element 
segments may be stacked (outer segments on intact inner or inner segments in intact outer) to form 
element pairs in a fuel basket position.  The height of stacked segments can not exceed the length of intact 
element supporting the segment stack." [Ref. 14, p.14] 
4.2 MCO Basket for Mark IV 
The Mark IV fuel consists of an inner assembly with a pre-irradiation enrichment of 0.947% and an outer 
assembly with a pre-irradiation enrichment of 0.947%.  The length of the Mark IV fuel ranges from 44 cm 
(17.4-in) to 66 cm (26.1-in.).  Analyses should be based on the 66 cm (26.1-in.) long elements.  The 
pertinent dimensions and weights comprising the Mark IV elements are given in Table 3-1 [Ref. 2]. 
 
The proposed configuration consists of fifty-four Mark IV elements per basket (Figure 4-2) loaded in an 
upright position.  Five baskets containing Mark IV SNF are then placed into an MCO.  Previous criticality 
safety calculations [Ref. 12 & 14] allow two of the five baskets within the MCO to contain scrap or 
degraded Mark IV fuel.  Heat transfer considerations indicate that a maximum of two scrap baskets may 
be loaded in an MCO and that they must be placed into the MCO as top and bottom baskets.  The Mark 
IV scrap baskets are limited to a maximum of 980 kg [Ref. 12, p. 4-4], and used a 0.95% enrichment 
value [Ref. 13, p. 33].  Scrap basket design does not limit the mass of scrap in a basket; the scrap limits 
are based on spills of the baskets in the K Basins where there is sludge containing fissile material on the 
floor [Ref. 12, pg. 4-4]. 
The Mark IV basket is an annular type basket constructed of 304L stainless steel (Figure 4-3). The fifty-
four elements are housed in the annular section.  The center post is comprised of a 7.201 cm (2.835-in.) 
outside diameter stainless steel, with a wall thickness of 1.378 cm (0.54-in.) [Ref. 4, Dwg. # H-2-828070, 
Sht. 2, Rev. 2].  There are six, 304L SS, round-bar support rods of 3.33 cm (1.3125-in.) diameter equally 
spaced around the outer periphery of the basket.  These rods aid in distributing the axial load of the 
fuel/scrap baskets when the MCO is in the vertical position. 
The basket used to house intact Mark IV fuel assemblies has an outer shell that extends approximately 
35.56 cm (~14-in.)  the height of the bucket.  The outside shell is constructed of 18-gauge (0.048-in.) 
304L stainless steel [Ref. 4, Dwg. # H-2-828070, Sht 1, Rev. 2].  The outer diameter of the outer shell is 
57.468 cm (22.625-in. diameter).  Each of the baskets, for intact assemblies, contains an aluminum 
element spacer guide at the bottom of the basket.  This spacer is approximately 6.35 cm (2.5-in.) thick 
axially and arranges the Mark IV elements in the triangular pitch configuration at a typical center-to-
center pitch of 6.99 cm (2.75-in.) [Ref. 4, Dwg. # H-2-828070, Sht. 1, Rev. 1] shown in Figure 4-2.  The 
inside height of the basket is 67.30 cm (26.496-in.), with an overall outer height of 70.86 cm (27.897-in.).  
The perforated plate at the base of the basket is 3.05 cm (1.20-in.) thick. 
The Mark IV scrap basket is also an annular type basket constructed primarily of 304L stainless steel 
(Figure 4-4).  The Mark IV scrap material is housed in the annular section.  The center post is comprised 
of a 7.201 cm (2.835-in.) outside diameter stainless steel pipe, with a wall thickness of 1.378 cm (0.54-
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in.) with an outer shell comprised of 18-gauge (0.048-in.) stainless steel sheet metal [Ref. 4, Dwg. # H-2-
828070, Sht 1 to 4, various revisions].  The outer diameter of the outer shell is equal to 57.468 cm 
(22.625-in.).  The basket bottom plate is constructed from 3.05 cm (1.20-in.) thick stainless steel with 
1.27 cm (0.5-in.) drain holes drilled through [Ref. 4, Dwg. # H-2-828075, Sht 5, Rev. 4].  The scrap 
baskets do not contain the aluminum element spacer guide at the bottom of the basket.  The scrap baskets 
are divided equally into six compartments separated by six, full-height copper plates (ASTM B152) that 
are 0.318 cm (0.125-in.) thick. [Ref. 4, Dwg. # H-2-828075, Sht 3, Rev. 3].  The center of these 
assembled, truncated arcs form a hexagon with a 17.78 cm (7.0-in.) dimension across the flats (see Figure 
4-7 for example of the scrap basket structure).  The outer dimensional 'height' of the shroud (in cross 
section) is 19.84 cm (7.81-in.).  The outer shroud height is 69.09 cm (27.20-in.). 
4.3 MCO Basket for Mark IA Fuels 
The basket is an annular type basket constructed of 304L stainless steel (Figure 4-5).  The center post is 
machined stainless steel barstock (actual dimension of 16.828 cm (6.625-in.)) and the wall thickness is 
6.19 cm (2.4375-in).  The outer wall of the basket is comprised of 18-gauge stainless steel sheet metal, 
with the inner diameter of the outer shell equal to 57.468 cm (22.625-in.). The forty-eight elements are 
housed in the annular section.  The overall outer height basket is 58.882 cm (23.182-in.) [Ref. 4, Dwg # 
H-2-828060, Sht 1, Rev 2].  The basket bottom plate is constructed from 3.05 cm (1.20-in.) thick stainless 
steel with drain holes drilled through.  Each of the baskets contains an aluminum element spacer guide at 
the bottom of the basket.  This spacer is approximately 6.35 cm (2.5-in.) thick and arranges the elements 
in the triangular pitch configuration at a typical center-to-center pitch of 6.99 cm (2.75-in.) as shown in 
Figure 4-2 [Ref. 4, Dwg # H-2-828060, Sht 4, Rev. 2]. 
The scrap baskets do not have the aluminum spacer element guide located at the bottom (Figure 4-6).  
Scrap consists of various sized pieces and sections from Mark IA elements that have structurally failed. 
The scrap baskets (Figure 4-7) are divided into six individual compartments consisting of 0.318 cm 
(0.125-in.) thick copper plate (ASTM B152) material [Ref. 4, Dwg # H-2-828065, Shts 1 thru 5, Rev. 1].  
Each compartment occupies a 60° arc (six segments) within the canister.  Six trapezoidal posts (equally 
spaced radially on the outer periphery of the basket) provide structural support and a small degree of 
standoff (58.882 cm [23.182-in.]) height from the basket shroud (56.642 cm [22.30-in.]).  The basket 
shroud assembly is shaped like a truncated (on the pointed end) piece of pie.  The 60° arc is formed on a 
28.410 cm (11.185-in.) outer radius and an overall height from the outside of the radius to the outside of 
the flat truncation of 17.475 cm (6.88-in.).  The flat-to-flat inside dimension of the hex shape formed by 
the joined surfaces of the scrap shrouds measures 22.54 cm (8.875-in.).  A trapezoid piece of 304L SS bar 
stock is centered within each compartment on the outer radius.  The following trapezoid cross-section 
dimensions (maximums) include a 3.734 cm (1.47-in.) height, 3.175 cm (1.25-in.) short base, a projected 
7.960 cm (3.134-in.) long base w/ 0.635 cm (0.25-in.) radius on those corners.  The thickness of the 
bottom plate of the basket is 3.05 cm (1.20-in.).  The overall outer diameter of each basket is 57.468 cm 
(22.625-in.).  The Mark IA scrap baskets are limited to a maximum loading to 575 kg [Ref. 12, p. 4-4], 
and used a 1.25% enrichment value [Ref. 13, p. 33]. 
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Figure 4-3.  Mark IV SNF Intact Element Storage Basket. 
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Figure 4-4.  Mark IV SNF Scrap Material Storage Basket. 
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Figure 4-5.  Mark IA SNF Intact Element Storage Basket. 
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Figure 4-6.  Mark IA SNF Scrap Material Storage Basket. 
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Figure 4-7.  Isometric Mark IA SNF Scrap Material Storage Basket. [Ref 5., Dwg # H-2-828065, Sht 1 
of 6] 
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4.4 MCO Assembly Weights 
The weight of an assembled MCO is design dependent based on the type of fuel being loaded.  Table 4-1 
provides a comparison of the various masses that can be encountered based on empty, loaded (maximum), 
and loaded(maximum)/flooded conditions. 
Table 4-1: MCO Assembly Weights [Ref. 3, p. 13] 
 
 Mark IA fuels 
(maximum: 48/basket * 6 
baskets = 288 elements)  
[240 elements & 1 scrap 
basket] 
[192 elements & 2 scrap 
baskets] 
Mark IV fuels 
(maximum: 54/basket * 5 
baskets = 270 elements) 
[216 elements & 1 scrap 
basket] 
[162 elements & 2 scrap 
baskets] 
 
Empty 
1990.5 kg 
(4379 lbs) 
1905.5 kg 
(4192 lbs) 
 
Loaded 
7310.0 kg 
(16,082 lbs) 
8746.4 kg 
(19,242 lbs) 
 
Loaded / flooded 
7906.4 kg 
(17,394 lbs) 
9298.7 kg 
(20,457 lbs) 
 
4.4.1 Scrap Baskets 
There were some basic assumptions made relative to both (intact fuel) basket and scrap basket loading.  
All these assumptions are detailed in Section D-4 of Appendix D.  For scrap baskets in particular, a brief 
summary of these assumptions follows: 
- Only two scrap baskets may be loaded in any MCO (on either or both ends)* 
- Scrap in Mark IV (scrap) baskets shall not exceed 26.5 inches in depth, nor 21 inches in depth 
for Mark IA fuels in their respective scrap baskets* 
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- Mark IA fuels are not allowed in any basket intended for Mark IV fuels, either scrap or 
intact* 
*Note: some of the bases identified in earlier studies have been superceded by subsequent 
analyses.  Scrap baskets are installed on the ends of the MCO due to heat transfer considerations; 
ultimately, for the degraded package condition, all baskets and their contents will be analyzed in a 
degraded condition and they also must meet criticality safety requirements.  Similarly, while 
'heights' are specified for scrap basket loadings, it will be mass loadings that govern acceptability.  
And as with all generalizations, there will be the exceptions caused as in the case of twelve specific 
Mark 1A fuel assemblies that need to be loaded into a Mark IV basket(s) to accommodate their 
overlength dimensions. 
The original specification identified a design feature common to both scrap baskets that provides 
'six equally spaced 1/4 inch thick copper divider plates to segment the scrap into six equal area 
compartments'.  Detailed design drawings now indicate those compartments will be constructed of 
0.318 cm (0.125-in.) thick copper plate material (ASTM B-152 UNS 12200-060).  Furthermore, 
the specification states: 'A partitioned area within the basket shall be designed for scrap fines 
loading. Scrap fines will vary in size from 1/4 inch pieces to approximately 1-inch pieces.  The 
total volume of the partitioned area shall not exceed 10 percent of the basket area.'  [Ref. 3, p. 17 & 
18]  The redesign of the center post in the Mark IA scrap basket virtually precludes intentional 
addition of any scrap between the center post and the inner wall of the scrap basket channels. 
Details associated with assumptions used in sensitivity studies of loaded MCOs are found in [Ref. 
12, Appendix B] 
DOE/SNF/REP-056 May 2000 
Rev. 0 Page 35 of 72 
 
5. REFERENCES 
1. Benedict, M., Pigford, T. H., and Levi, H. W., 1981, Nuclear Chemical Engineering, 2nd Edition., 
McGraw-Hill Book Co, New York, N.Y. 
2. Hanford, 1994, Hanford Spent Fuel Inventory Baseline, Bergsman, K. H., WHC-SD-SNF-TI-001, 
Rev. 0. 
3. Parsons Infrastructure and Technology Group, Inc., Multi-Canister Overpack Fabrication 
Specification, Contract No. KH-8009, HNF-S-0453, Rev. 1, HNF-SD-SNF-DR-003, Rev. 0, 
Appendix 19, , April 1997. 
4. Hanford, 1999, Multi-Canister Overpack, W-442, ECN 656429, Maiden, G. E., Sept. 25,1999. 
5. Wittekind, W. D., Criticality Safety Evaluation of Irradiated N Reactor MK1A and MKIV Fuel in 
Unconstrained Mark I and Mark II Fuel Canisters, WHC-SD-NR-CSER-009, Rev. 0, March, 
1993. 
6. Weakley, E. A., Fuels Engineering Technical Handbook, UNI-M-61, April 1979. 
7. Hanford, 1997, Hillesland, K. E., MCO Shield Plug Dose Rate Analysis, Fluor Daniel Northwest, 
HNF-SD-SNF-CN-026, Rev. 0, September 1997. 
8. Tobin, J. E., Specifications for Uranium-Metal Billets for N Reactor Fuel Elements, 
WHC-SP-0056, August 1987. 
9. Hanford, 1999, Multi-Canister Overpack Drawings, W-442, ECN 648628, Smith, K. E., Feb. 11, 
1999 
10. Hanford, 1998, Reilly, M. A., Spent Nuclear Fuel Project Technical Databook, HNF-SD-TI-015, 
Rev 6, October 1998 
11. Hanford, 1997, Estimates of Particulate Mass in Multi-Canister Overpacks, Duke Engineering & 
Services Hanford, Inc., HNF-1527, Rev. 0 
12. Hanford, 2000, Criticality Safety Evaluation Report of the Multi-Canister Overpack, Fluor 
Hanford, HNF-SD-SNF-CSER-005, Rev. 5B, Kessler, S. F., March 2000 
13. Hanford, 2000, Criticality Safety Evaluation Report for Storage and Removal of Spent Nuclear 
Fuel from K Basin, Fluor Hanford, HNF-SD-SNF-CSER-010, Rev. 1B, Kessler, S. F., February 
2000 
14. Hanford, 2000, Pajunen, A. L., Spent Nuclear Fuel Project Product Specification, Fluor Hanford, 
HNF-SD-SNF-OCD-001, Rev. 4-A, ECN 659418, April 2000 
DOE/SNF/REP-056 May 2000 
Rev. 0 Page 36 of 72 
 
Appendix A 
U-metal Fuel Inventories 
DOE/SNF/REP-056 May 2000 
Rev. 0 Page 37 of 72 
 
Table A-1.  U-metal Fuel Inventories. 
Compound Clad Site Fuel Name 
No. of Fuel 
Unit  
(yr 2035) Fuel Unit  
BOL 
U235 
(kg) 
Fissile Mass 
(kg) 
Effect 
Enrich %
EOL 
U235 % 
U Mass 
(kg) 
Total Mass 
(kg) 
Vol 
(M3) MTHM 
U Metal Zirconium SRS EBWR (U-METAL) ENRICHED 
HEAVY [64] 
53 ASSEMBLY 42.93 37.82 1.27 1.14 2978.5 3922.0 0.76 2.98
U Metal Zirconium HANFORD N REACTOR [147] 50694 ASSEMBLY  12991.86 1.13 0.95 1143793.0 1723596.0 99.87 1145.94
U Metal Zirconium HANFORD N REACTOR [148] 52986 ASSEMBLY  12175.12 1.28 1.08 952385.2 1801524.0 104.38 954.26
U Metal Zirconium SRS HWCTR SMT-1-2 (U-METAL) 
LEU [767] 
2 ELEMENT  0.19 0.66 0.52 29.0 6.2 0.00 0.03
U Metal Zirconium SRS HWCTR RMT (U-METAL) LEU 
[790] 
5 ELEMENT  0.14 0.62 0.62 22.5 147.6 0.03 0.02
U Metal Zirconium SRS HWCTR TWNT (U-METAL) 
LEU [791] 
17 ELEMENT  3.01 0.65 0.58 461.7 771.8 0.42 0.46
U Metal Zirconium SRS HWCTR ETWO (U-METAL) 
LEU [867] 
6 ELEMENT  0.82 1.69 1.69 48.5 177.1 0.04 0.05
U Metal Zirconium SRS HWCTR SMT-1-3 (U-METAL) 
LEU [868] 
5 ELEMENT  0.18 0.52 0.39 34.9 15.4 0.00 0.03
U Metal Zirconium SRS HWCTR IMT (U-METAL/ZR) 
DU [869] 
65 ELEMENT  0.65 0.82 0.51 78.7 201.5 0.03 0.08
U Metal Zirconium SRS HWCTR SPR (U-METAL) LEU 
[879] 
4 ELEMENT  0.44 0.69 0.58 64.0 224.8 0.03 0.06
U Metal Zirconium SRS HWCTR TFEN (U-METAL) 
LEU [880] 
13 ELEMENT  2.33 1.31 0.93 176.8 590.2 0.22 0.18
U Metal Zirconium SRS EBWR (U-METAL) ENRICHED 
THIN [887] 
54 ASSEMBLY  28.68 1.31 1.11 2189.0 6548.9 0.77 2.19
U Metal Zirconium SRS EBWR (U-METAL)          ET-11 
[888] 
1 ASSEMBLY 0.58 0.50 1.29 1.10 38.3 60.0 0.01 0.04
U Metal Zirconium SRS EBWR (U-METAL) NORMAL 
HEAVY [889] 
11 ASSEMBLY 4.42 3.97 0.70 0.66 565.8 814.0 0.16 0.57
U Metal Zirconium SRS EBWR (U-METAL) NORMAL 
THIN [890] 
7 ASSEMBLY 2.02 2.00 0.72 0.69 278.9 385.0 0.10 0.28
            Total  2107.18
* Effective Enrichment % = Σ (233U + 235U + 239Pu)/ UTOT (in mass units) 
Data from INEEL Spent Fuel Database as of December 22, 1999 (Rev. 3.60).  The information contained in this database is neither 'qualified' nor has it been validated/verified.  It can be used in a qualitative 
manner for selection of fuels to be evaluated in conceptualized packaging.  Specific fuel assemblies information must be gathered from specific, referenced documents for any detailed analyses. 
All the N Reactor fuel assemblies and the scrap materials employ an identical MCO canister configuration but with variations for the internal basket structures. 
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Appendix B 
Source Term Data 
Time Since Last Irradiation 
Based on Mark IV fuel assemblies with a 16% Pu-240 content discharged from the reactor in 1984, and 
decayed to 1/1/95. 
Shielding Source Terms 
The gamma sources for the N Reactor fuel assemblies are given below in Table B-1 through B-4.  These 
values represent the highest and average source exhibited by any MCO containing N Reactor assemblies.  
An ORIGEN2 computer code was used to calculate the gamma ray source. [Ref. 7, p. 3] 
Table B-1.  Maximum Photon Source Term per MCO.  [Ref. 7, p. 4] 
Upper Energy 
Boundaries (MeV) 
Average Energy
(MeV)  Photons/s/MCO  
0.02 1.50E-02  1.75E+15  
0.03 2.50E-02  3.87E+14  
0.05 3.75E-02  4.21E+14  
0.07 5.75E-02  3.46E+14  
0.10 8.50E-02  1.95E+14  
0.15 1.25E-01  1.48E+14  
0.30 2.25E-01  1.66E+14  
0.45 3.75E-01  8.64E+13  
0.70 6.62E-01a  2.81E+15  
1.00 8.50E-01  1.04E+14  
1.50 1.25E-00  4.33E+13  
2.00 1.75E-00  1.29E+12  
2.50 2.25E-00  9.42E+10  
3.00 2.75E-00  4.67E+09  
4.00 3.50E-00  6.04E+08  
6.00 5.00E-00  3.71E+05  
8.00 7.00E-00  4.23E+04  
14.00 1.10E+01  4.84E+03  
 Total  6.45E+15  
 
a.  Changed from 0.575 MeV to 0.662 MeV to accurately reflect 137mBa gamma ray. 
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Table B-2.  Average Photon Source Term per MCO.  [Ref. 7, p.5] 
Upper Energy 
Boundaries (MeV) 
Average Energy
(MeV)  Photons/s/MCO  
0.02 1.50E-02  1.56E+14  
0.03 2.50E-02  3.25E+13  
0.05 3.75E-02  3.60E+13  
0.07 5.75E-02  3.12E+13  
0.10 8.50E-02  1.74E+13  
0.15 1.25E-01  1.21E+13  
0.30 2.25E-01  1.46E+13  
0.45 3.75E-01  6.60E+12  
0.70 6.62E-01*  2.06E+14**  
1.00 8.50E-01  2.79E+12  
1.50 1.25E-00  1.79E+12  
2.00 1.75E-00  6.24E+10  
2.50 2.25E-00  2.84E+09  
3.00 2.75E-00  6.81E+07  
4.00 3.50E-00  8.67E+06  
6.00 5.00E-00  2.03E+04  
8.00 7.00E-00  2.31E+03  
14.00 1.10E+01  2.63E+02  
 Total  5.17E+14  
*  Changed from 0.575 MeV to 0.662 MeV to accurately reflect 137mBa gamma ray. 
**  Scaled to conserve energy as a result of changing energy bin from 0.575 MeV to 0.662 MeV. 
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Table B-3.  Maximum Neutron Source Term for an MCO.  [Ref. 7, p. 8] 
 
Component of Source
 Source Strength
(neutrons/s/MCO)
 
 (α,n)  3.95 × 106  
 Spontaneous fissions  7.79 × 106  
 Total  1.17 × 107  
 
Table B-4.  Average Neutron Source Term for an MCO.  [Ref. 7, p. 8] 
 Component of Source  
Source Strength
(neutrons/s/MCO)  
 (α,n)  2.07 × 106  
 Spontaneous fissions  2.35 × 106  
 Total  4.42 × 106  
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Table B-5.  N-Fuel Source Term - Shielding Design Basis  [Ref. 10, p. 20] 
 
(based on Mk IV fuel at 16% Pu-240 aged 13.5 years) 
Safety Basis and Design Basis are the same. 
Isotope Activity 
(Ci/MTU) 
Heat 
Generation 
(W/MTU) 
Isotope Activity 
(Ci/MTU) 
Heat 
Generation 
(W/MTU) 
H-3 4.03E+01 1.36E-03 Sn-123 4.08E-09 1.26E-11 
C-14 5.27E-01 1.54E-04 Sn-126 1.22E-01 3.57E-05 
Fe-55 5.23E-00 1.75E-04 Sb-124 0.00 0.00 
Co-60 6.27E-00 9.64E-02 Sb-125 0.00 0.00 
Ni-59 3.03E-02 1.21E-06 Sb-126 1.71E-02 3.10E-04 
Ni-63 3.53E-00 3.57E-04 Sb-126m 1.22E-01 1.57E-03 
Se-79 6.23E-02 1.93E-05 Te-123m 1.19E-13 1.72E-16 
Kr-85 6.23E+02 9.33E-01 Te-125m 0.00 0.00 
Sr-89 0.00 0.00 Te-127 1.16E-10 1.57E-13 
Sr-90 8.19E+03 9.50E-00 Te-127m 1.19E-10 5.88E-14 
Y-90 8.19E+03 4.53E+01 Te-129 0.00 0.00 
Y-91 0.00 0.00 Te-129m 0.00 0.00 
Zr-93 2.83E-01 3.25E-05 I-129 4.88E-03 2.29E-06 
Zr-95 4.20E-18 2.12E-20 Cs-134 1.07E+02 1.10E-00 
Nb-93m 1.38E-01 2.47E-05 Cs-135 5.77E-02 1.93E-05 
Nb-95 9.33E-18 4.48E-20 Cs-137 1.13E+04 1.14E+01 
Nb-95m 3.12E-20 4.12E-23 Ba-137m 1.07E+04 4.18E+01 
Tc-99 2.08E-00 1.05E-03 Ce-141 0.00 0.00 
Ru-103 0.00 0.00 Ce-144 1.75E-00 1.15E-03 
Ru-106 9.38E-00 5.59E-04 Pr-143 0.00 0.00 
Rb-103m 0.00 0.00 Pr-144 1.73E-00 1.26E-02 
Rb-106 9.38E-00 8.97E-02 Pr-144m 2.10E-02 7.05E-06 
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Isotope Activity 
(Ci/MTU) 
Heat 
Generation 
(W/MTU) 
Isotope Activity 
(Ci/MTU) 
Heat 
Generation 
(W/MTU) 
Pd-107 1.44E-02 7.94E-07 Pm-147 1.06E+03 3.88E-01 
Ag-110 4.15E-06 3.11E-11 Pm-148 0.00 0.00 
Ag-110m 3.12E-04 5.18E-06 Pm-148m 0.00 0.00 
Cd-113m 3.96E-00 4.35E-03 Sm-151 1.08E+02 1.26E-02 
Cd-115m 0.00 0.00 Eu-152 1.22E-00 5.50E-03 
In-113m 2.59E-11 5.98E-14 Eu-154 2.02E+02 1.81E-00 
Sn-113 2.59E-11 4.30E-15 Eu-155 3.42E+01 2.48E-02 
Sn-119m 0.00 0.00 Gd-153 3.92E-06 3.53E-09 
Sn-121m 0.00 0.00 Tb-160 2.22E-19 1.78E-21 
 Fission and 
Activation 
Product Totals 
  4.06E+04 1.12E+02 
      
  Actinides    
U-234 3.92E-01 1.11E-02 Pu-241 9.42E+03 2.92E-01 
U-235 1.31E-02 3.54E-04 Pu-242 7.46E-02 2.17E-03 
U-236 7.12E-02 1.89E-03 Am-241 2.92E+02 9.57E-00 
U-238 3.35E-01 8.35E-03 Am-242 3.19E-01 2.66E-03 
Np-237 4.42E-02 1.27E-03 Am-242m 3.21E-01 4.91E-04 
Pu-238 1.28E+02 4.16E-00 Am-243 2.22E-01 7.02E-03 
Pu-239 1.68E+02 5.14E-00 Cm-242 2.65E-01 9.59E-03 
Pu-240 1.28E+02 3.90E-00 Cm-244 4.62E-00 1.59E-01 
  Actinide 
Totals
 1.01E+04 2.33E+01 
06/02/1997 RADNCU2A run for shielding design basis (Mk IV fuel at 16% Pu-240).  Results decayed to 
5/31/1998.  Total mass of fuel in this run 2.50e+00 MTU.  Total activity of fuel in this run 1.32e+05 Ci.  
Total heat generation from the fuel in this run 3.55e+02 W. 
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Appendix C 
Estimates of Particulate Mass in  
Multi-Canister Overpacks 
 
[excerpted directly from Ref. 11;  
no graphics or pictures included]
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ESTIMATES OF PARTICULATE MASS IN MULTI-CANISTER  
OVERPACKS [Ref. 11] 
 
1.0  PURPOSE 
 
The purpose of this report is to document the process and results of expert judgement 
estimates of the particulate mass loaded with K-basins fuel into a multi-canister overpack container 
(MCO).  The purpose of the process is to create defensible low, best-estimate, and bounding values 
using the best available evidence and to elucidate the relationship between evidence and values. 
 
2.0  SUMMARY 
 
Low, best-estimate, and bounding values for the particulate mass loaded into a multi-canister 
overpack container with fuel and scrap are provided here.  Due to inherent variability in the geometry of 
fuel (damage level, character of scrap, character of particulate, etc.) and the limited amount of 
characterization data presently and economically available, a statistically derived estimate cannot be 
calculated.  Therefore, values here are based upon collective expert judgement with a clear traceable 
path from available evidence to the bottom-line results.  The judgement process and body of evidence 
are documented here. 
 
The judgement process was carried out by a group of persons with diverse backgrounds but 
familiarity with K-basins fuel and the issues associated with particulate loading. Participants were: 
Thierry Flament (Numatec), Lewis Muhlestein (ARES); Al Pitner (Duke Engineering & Services 
Hanford), Marty Plys (Fauske & Associates), and Jim Sloughter (Numatec).  A brief statement of 
qualifications appears in Appendix A. 
 
The motivation for the expert judgement was to consider new characterization data which was 
unavailable for previous estimates, and to; reconsider the estimation technique based upon the 
observations. 
 
Basic steps in the process were to gather and review characterization data, identify and 
mathematically describe locations holding particulate, formulate appropriate technical bases and 
assumptions, list the required parameters, and provide parameter values supported by the evidence.  
Evidence used for the judgement includes videotapes and photographs of fuel assemblies and 
particulate, survey data on the damage state of K-basins fuel, and characterization data on particulate.  
Simple geometric relations were developed for the identified particulate locations.  Reasons for 
selection of each parameter value are documented here. 
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The rounded best-estimate particulate loading of an MCO is 8 kg and the bounding particulate 
loading is 60 kg; a low value is 2 kg.  The greatest contribution to these values, nearly 50%, is 
particulate generated in the scrap basket before and during CVD -- this is noteworthy because it can 
contain only a very limited amount of chemically bound water. 
 
3.0 SOURCES 
 
Sources of information and evidence used as basic references by the panel to formulate 
technical bases, create assumptions, and assign values to process and geometric parameters are 
described here. 
 
3.1 K-Basins Fuel Survey Data 
 
A full basin video survey of fuel stored in K East Basin was conducted in 1994 [Pitner 1995]. 
The fuel in this basin is stored in open canisters with the tops of the fuel elements visible in most of the 
canisters (some were covered with debris).  The condition of each of the ~35,000 fuel assemblies 
visually examined was rated based on the top end views.  The video survey was subsequently followed 
up by limited "lift and look" surveys where about 225 individual assemblies were extracted from 
selected canisters and examined over their full length [Pitner 1997a].  These extended examinations 
basically confirmed the results for fuel damage distributions established from the previous "top only" 
visual survey. 
 
In K West Basin, the fuel is stored in sealed canisters with lids placed atop the canisters.  Valve 
systems are incorporated in the lids to permit the addition of corrosion inhibitor (potassium nitrite) and 
cover gas (nitrogen).  A limited "lift and look" survey was conducted in K West Basin where lids were 
removed from twenty selected canisters and about 250 fuel assemblies were extracted and examined 
[Pitner 1997b]. 
 
The fuel condition in these surveys was rated based on the following categories. 
 
Intact - No evidence of cladding breach or deposited sludge. An example of an intact 
inner element from K East Basin is shown in Figure 1. The element is being 
held by a grapple used to extract it from the canister. A W spring and spacer 
shoe used to center the inner element inside the outer element are visible in the 
photo. 
 
Breached - Minor cladding rupture with no reacted fuel or deposited sludge visibly present. 
Figure 2 presents an example of a breached outer fuel element from K West Basin. 
A top end rupture and a minor spiral crack can be seen. A portion of the top of the 
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element evidently protruded into the cover gas above the water in the canister, and 
' does not exhibit the grayish coating seen on the lower portion. 
 
Defected -  Definite evidence of cladding breach with reacted fuel egressing from the element. 
The amount of exposed fuel may be significant, but there is no gross cladding 
splitting, element dilation, or fuel voiding. In Figure 3 (not included), the top end 
of an inner element from K East Basin is seen to be ruptured with reacted fuel 
present in the area of the rupture. 
 
Bad -   Gross failure is evident with substantial element dilation, cladding splitting, 
fuel "mushrooming," or fuel voiding. Figure 4 (not included) shows a canister 
in K East Basin that contains fuel assemblies that would all be rated in the bad 
category. Considerable cladding splitting and fuel voiding are prevalent in this 
canister. 
 
The fuel damage distribution determined from these surveys is presented in the following 
table. 
 
K East  K West 
 
Intact  49 %     50 % 
. Breached 9 % 39 % 
 Defected 38 %   0 %  
 Bad 4 %  11 % 
 
About half the fuel assemblies in both basins were found to be intact. It is seen that no K West 
fuel assemblies fall in the defected category.  This presumably reflects the effectiveness of the 
corrosion inhibitor added to the canisters.  While the relative level of bad fuel assemblies in K West 
appears to be significantly greater than that in K East, the actual degree of damage on bad K West 
elements is generally less than that seen on bad K East elements.  Figure 5 (not included) shows a K 
West element that has split cladding on the top end, and would accordingly be classified as bad.  The 
overall damage level on this element, however, is significantly less than any of those shown in Figure 
4 (not included) for K East bad elements. 
 
When fuel elements were extracted from the canisters for examination or transfer to a shipping 
cask for subsequent characterization activities, sludge clouds often trailed the element, particularly in 
the K East Basin.  This is sludge that is drawn from the bottom of the canister by the lifting action on 
the element.  Figure 6 (not included) shows an intense sludge cloud trailing a K East outer element 
being transferred from the canister to a shipping container.  The sludge clouds were very flocculent in 
nature, but generally settled relatively quickly. 
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Most of the fuel elements in the K Basins had a thin grayish colored coating on their surface.  It 
was found that this light coating was easily removed by a wire brush apparatus. Figure 7 (not included) 
shows an outer element after wire brushing the portion below the top spacers shoes.  As shown, the 
lower brushed portion appears clean, while the grey film can still be seen on the upper portion.  The 
rust blisters on the carbon steel spacer shoes were also readily removed by wire brushing. 
 
Some of the fuel elements in the sealed K West canisters were found to have a heavy white or 
translucent coating on them.  This coating is illustrated in Figure 8 (not included), which shows the 
coating present on both the inner and outer elements of the fuel assembly.  It was noted that the coating 
sometimes flaked off the surface of the element when struck by another object.  About 15 % of the 
canisters opened in K West were found to have this heavy coating on the fuel assemblies, and always in 
both barrels of the canister.  All of the fuel elements displaying this heavy white coating were contained 
in aluminum canisters. 
 
3.2 Subsurface Examination 
 
Two outer fuel elements from K West Basin and one outer element from K East Basin were 
transferred to a hot cell to examine the fuel condition underneath damaged cladding areas [Pitney . 
1997c]. The elements were selected based on the apparent "peelability" of the damaged cladding and 
the potential for corroded fuel beneath the damaged area. 
 
The in basin appearance of K West Element 6743U is shown in Figure 9 (not included).  The 
fuel element had open cracks near its midsection and split open cladding with some fuel voiding at 
the bottom.  Significant sludge trails out the bottom were noted when the fuel element was extracted 
from its canister for visual examination and again when it was extracted for transfer to the Single 
Fuel Element Canister (SFEC) for shipment to the hot cells.  No sludge was seen to exit from the 
midsection breach during the in-basin handling. 
 
The in-basin appearance of K East Element 5427E is shown in Figure 10 (not included).  The 
inner element was found to be stuck under the displaced end cap of the outer element, so the full 
assembly was transferred to the SFEC.  There was major damage apparent on both ends of the outer 
fuel element.  Substantial sludge trailed from the assembly when it was removed from the canister, and 
particulate material was also released from the top end during the transfer operation.  The outer element 
was subsequently broken in two near its cracked midsection when a flaring tool was used in the hot cell 
to open the top end so that a grapple could be inserted. 
 
The in-basin appearance of K West Element 7913U is shown in Figure 11(not included).  The 
element had an open crack near its midsection and also at the bottom.  The fuel element actually had a 
hinged appearance at the midsection breach and appeared ready to break in two.  Considerable sludge 
was released when the element was extracted from its canister. At the visual examination station in the 
basin, sludge was observed to be continuously suctioned from the bottom breach area by a nearby 
pump used to capture loose debris in the pit. When the fuel element was extracted a second time for 
transfer to the SFEC, an overhead camera showed that sludge was periodically expelled from the 
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midsection breach area as the element flexed during the extraction and transfer operation. 
 
The loose cladding around damaged areas was peeled away and the underlying surface 
examined.  Figure 12 (not included) shows the center breach area on the 6743U element after' peeling 
and particulate sampling.  As much as possible particulate matter under the peeled region was collected 
using a combination of picks, scrapers, and brushes.  However, it was found that for the most part the 
fuel under the peeled cladding was quite firm and it was difficult to remove particulate material.  The 
largest amount obtained from any damage area (top of 5427E) is shown in Figure 13 (not included).  
The mass of this sample was 15.5 g. 
 
The water from each SFEC was strained to capture any residue material that might 
have escaped from the fuel elements during shipping and handling.  Typically. the quantity of 
material recovered from the SFEC was equal to or greater than that which could be scraped 
from damaged areas on the fuel elements after peeling away the cladding.  This suggests that 
the cleaning procedure planned for the fuel elements prior to MCO loading should be quite 
effective in removing particulate material. 
 The total particulate material quantities recovered from all damaged areas on the fuel elements 
are given in the following table. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
An additional element was transferred to the hot cells to recover the heavy white coating from a 
K West fuel element. Figure 14  (not included) shows a putty knife being used to remove the coating from 
the surface of the element. This technique was successful in removing the material, which typically 
spalled off as large flakes. Figure 15  (not included) shows the total sample recovered after scraping the 
full outer surface of the element. The weight of this sample was 8.5 g. 
 
3.3 Fuel Handling, Loading, Transfer, and CVD Process 
 
A maximum time of 30 days is used for basket queuing at the basins.  Transport to CVD is 
assumed to require four hours; results are not sensitive to these values. 
 
 
 
 
The following schedule for CVD allows for two cycles with these steps: 
 
Element Particulate Recovered (g) 
KW 6743U 6.1 
KE 5427E 20.3 
KW 7913U 11.9 
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17.3 hours at 10 C . 
25.6 hours at 50 C 
14.5 hours at 75 C 
  4.5 hours at 25 C. 
 
3.4 Fuel Oxidation  
 
Fuel corrosion at K-East causes cesium release corresponding to a range from 200 to 980 
grams. U per day, where the low value corresponds to well-controlled water chemistry and 
temperature.  A mean value of 500 g U/day for the basin is chosen here, leading to an average 
corrosion rate for an MCO at the basin temperature of 2.5 g U/day. 
 
The reaction of uranium with water or steam results in slightly hyperstoiciometric U02 when 
no oxygen is present, but also results in formation of U03 when oxygen is present.  U03 is partly 
transformed into U03.2H2O at temperatures below about 80 C.  The corrosion rate is about a factor of 
20 lower when oxygen is present compared to the rate in a nearly oxygen-free environment, with the 
change occurring at about 10 ppm oxygen.  No U03 or U03 hydrate can be formed in the absence of 
oxygen; the process is not thermodynamically possible.  The extent of conversion of U02 to hydrated 
U03 can be 30% in two months at 80 C when the starting material is a finely divided powder. 
 
Corrosion of uranium in water saturated with hydrogen and in steam occur at the same rate 
and are correlated by [Pearce, 1989]  
 
log K = 7.364 - 3016/T  
 
for water without oxygen, and considering the factor of 20 reduction with oxygen results in  
 
  log K = 6.063 - 3016/T 
 
In mixture of steam and inert gases, the reaction rate decreases when the steam partial pressure 
is below saturation, and the applicable correlation is log K = 5.024 - 2401/T + 0.5 log P where P is in 
kPa.  In the above equations, T in is Kelvin and K is grams of weight gained per cm2 per hour.  Thus, 
the rate of formation of particulate is found by multiplying the value for K by the surface area and the 
molecular weight ratio of the oxide to oxygen, 270/32. 
 
A reaction rate multiplier is typically applied to the correlations above to account for surface 
roughness, irradiation, and the possible presence of hydrides which have large specific surface area; 
and assumed values are discussed in Section 5 below.  
 
 
 
 
3.5 Geometry and Miscellaneous Values 
 
Fuel element dimensions and derived values used here are: 
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Outer Element: 2.42" OD, 1.70" ID, 26.1 " length, surface area 2210 cm2 
 Inner Element: 1.28" OD, 0.48" ID, 26.0" length, surface area 942 cm2 so 
 the total surface area of an assembly is 3152 cm2. 
 
4.0 TOP-LEVEL TECHNICAL BASES AND ASSUMPTIONS 
 
Top-Level technical bases and assumptions derived logically by the expert panel from the 
sources presented above are listed here as the first step in formulation of particulate estimates. 
Detailed technical bases and assumptions are provided in Section 5 for the selection of individual 
equations and parameter values. 
 
 Top-Level technical bases formulated from the evidence include: 
 
 1. Particulate Locations. Based upon visual evidence, particulate loaded into an 
 MCO is assumed to predominantly be found in the following locations: 
 
1.1  A surface layer on cladding. Some fuel elements in K West canisters have a 
transparent or milky white coating; other elements from both basins have a grey 
coat, with the exception of one canister in K-West whose elements have a red 
coating. 
 
1.2 An oxide layer on exposed uranium. Ultimately uranium corrosion is 
responsible for creation of particulate. 
 
1.3  Particles adhering to uranium at fuel damage locations, either exposed or 
beneath the surface of cladding at the damage location. 
 
2. Negligible Loaded Particulate Contributors. Based upon visual evidence, and 
anticipated fuel handling, negligible particulate will be loaded into an MCO via: 
 
2.1  Blockages in the annulus and center void of an element. 
 
2.2  Accumulation of non-adherent beds of particles in voids at ballooned 
element ends or peeled cladding on element sides.  This is in contrast to 
tenaciously adhering particles found under mildly displaced cladding at 
failure locations, and represents for example particulate observed falling out 
of assemblies and causing notable turbid plumes during fuel handling.. 
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3. Generated Particulate.  Particulate can be generated during queuing for transfer to CVD and during 
CVD itself from the simple mechanism of oxidation of exposed metallic surfaces.  The method of 
[Pajunen, 1996] is adopted and modified for this contribution.  This contribution is considered 
because the duration of queuing can, via literature correlations and best estimates of fuel reactive 
area, lead to non-negligible corrosion, and temperatures during processing are high compared to 
those of storage in the K-basins, again leading to non-negligible production of corrosion products. 
 
4. Character of Fuel and Scrap.  Observations of fuel damage and project definitions used to 
assign fuel assemblies to scrap and fuel baskets in an MCO are important for assignment of 
parameters such as reactive surface area.  Scrap and fuel character are described by: 
 
4.1 The effective number of assemblies loaded into a scrap basket is given by the 
scrap basket criticality weight limit, 930 kg, and the average weight of an 
element, 25.07 kg, or 37.1 assemblies.  [By calculation, a Mark IA scrap basket 
loading of 575 kg and an average weight of a Mark IA assembly of 18kg yields 
the equivalent of 31.9 assemblies.] 
 
4.2 Fuel elements described as "bad" or having split cladding and missing 
end caps are assumed to be placed in scrap baskets [Pajunen, 1997]. 
 
4.3 An MCO contains one scrap basket and four fuel baskets. 
 
4.4 Fuel will be cleaned by tumbling. 
 
4.5  Handling and transport of damaged fuel elements already shipped 
from the K-basins has resulted in removal of large amounts of sludge 
as described above. 
 
Top-level assumptions formulated from the evidence to quantify the amount of particulate are: 
 
1. Cladding Surface Layers. The white surface layer loading is 0.01 g/cm2 based on 
[Pitner, 1997], and the grey surface layer loading is 0.0006 g/cm2 based on [Marschman, 
1997].  The white layer value is used for bounding estimate, and the grey value is used 
for a best-estimate.  Incipient formation of white layers in local spots and the presence 
of local reddish spots are subsumed into the bounding estimate. 
 
2. Adherent Oxide Layer Thicknesses.  A bounding oxide layer thickness is 16 microns 
and a best-estimate is 3 microns, the largest value found in [Marschman,. Pyecha, and 
Abrefah, 1997]. 
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3. Reaction Area: Area of Adherent Oxide Layers.  A bounding uranium area for the scrap 
basket is 6 m2 based upon [Duncan, 1997].  A nominal value of 3 m2 was selected based upon 
judgement.  A low value of 1 m2 was chosen.  The bounding uranium area of 7 m2 and a best 
estimate of 3 m2 were used for fuel in four fuel baskets [Duncan, 1997]. 
 
4. Tenacious Particulate.  A best-estimate for particulate on a badly damaged fuel element 
placed in a scrap basket is 20 g based on [Pitner, 1997], and a bounding value is a factor of ten 
larger, 200 g.  The best-estimate for scrap is used as the bounding value for an element placed 
in a scrap basket. 
 
5. Fuel Cleaning Efficacy.  Cleaning of fuel is very effective, and only the most tenacious 
particulate as seen by [Pitner, 1997] will remain.  As noted above, no particulate is observed 
plugging flow channels after fuel is moved.  All handling experience supports this assertion.  
Similarly, small fuel fragments collected after fuel tumbling will be cleaned so that negligible 
associated sludge will be loaded into an MCO. 
5.0 CALCULATION 
 
5.1 Scope 
 
The calculation considers materials which may be loaded into an MCO or generated in an 
MCO that are literally not cladding and fuel in their original form.  Particulate, corrosion product, 
and visible layers are included in this scope for two main reasons: 
 
1. Such materials are potentially entrainable from an MCO either during normal 
processing or during accidents, and/or 
 
2. Such materials may contain chemically bound or otherwise difficult to remove 
water which may through thermal decomposition or radiolysis affect MCO 
pressure. 
 
Thus while some observed layers may not be entrainable, they could harbor water, and some 
particulate may have little water, but may be entrainable; in either case these material forms are of 
interest here. 
 
The scope of time for particulate generation of interest here is between MCO loading and 
shipment to the canister storage building for staging.  This is selected because only particulate 
generated in this time period has the potential to chemically bind free water or water vapor, and the 
water inventory after CVD determines the potential for over pressurization in shipping and staging. 
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5.2 Corrosion Product and Particulate Locations and Geometry 
 
Corrosion product and particulate are considered in the following locations: 
 
1. Visible Layers on Cladding.  Two kinds of layers are considered here: A white or 
clear layer found in some K -West canisters'(Figure 14) and a grey layer found on all other 
fuel surfaces (Figures 2 and 7).  The white layer appears to resist brush cleaning but is brittle 
and may fall off during tumbling; the grey layer is easily removed by brush cleaning but is 
also very thin.  Since either of these layers are observed on all cladding surfaces, the 
associated mass is given by: 
 
Mlayer = Aassy Nassy  (m/A layer) 
.   
 where 
 Mlayer = Layer mass, kg 
Aassy  = Assembly area, cm2 
 
Nassy,                       = Number of assemblies, fuel plus scrap. 
 
 
( m/A layer )  = Mass per unit area .of layer, kg / cm2 
 
The area of an assembly is given by geometric data presented in Section 4.5: 
 
Aassy, = 3152 cm2 
 
'The number of assemblies is the sum of fuel assemblies for an MCO with four fuel baskets 
 
 Nassy,fuel= 4 * 54 = 216. 
 
The number of equivalent assemblies in a scrap basket is determined by the scrap basket weight 
limit divided by the average weight of an assembly: 
 
Nassy,scrap    =  930 kg/scrap basket   =   37.1 
      25.07 kg/assembly 
The mass per unit area of the layer is selected by judgement. 
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2. Oxide Film on Scrap.  All exposed uranium metal should have some oxide film because some 
corrosion must have occurred; an example is shown in Figure 16 (not included).  Scrap is considered 
separately from fuel because the area for scrap is deduced differently than the area for fuel.  The mass 
of an oxide layer is given by: 
 
M.ox,scrap = A ox,scrap (m/A ox) 
 
where 
 
Mox,sasp   = Oxide mass on scrap, kg . . 
 
Aox,scrap   = Oxidation area of scrap, m2 
 
(m/A ox, scrap ) = Mass per unit area of oxide layer, kg/m2 
 
The area A ox, scrap is chosen by expert judgement as discussed below.  The mass per unit 
area is further decomposed as the product of layer thickness and density: 
 
(m/A ox) = ρ layer δ layer 
 
 
ρ layer = Layer density, kg/m3 
 
δlayer = Layer thickness, m .. 
 
where both the layer density and thickness are chosen by judgement. 
 
3.  Oxide Layer on Fuel.  Fuel in fuel baskets has areas with cladding failure and the exposed metal 
must have some oxide layer.  The mass of this oxide is given by the same formula as for the scrap 
basket oxide: . 
 
  M ox,fuel  =  A ox,fuel (m/Aox) 
Here the exposed area is chosen by expert judgement considering different factors than for the scrap 
basket, but the mass per unit area is chosen in the same way as for that in the scrap basket. 
 
4.  Particulate on Scrap.  Particulate is found to be associated with failed areas, both on the 
failed area and locally underneath adjacent cladding that has become unbonded from the fuel 
(Figures 12 and 13 - not included).  Particulate associated with fuel and scrap are considered 
separately because the damage of scrap is more extensive and thus separate judgements are 
appropriate.  The mass of particulate associated with scrap is given by: 
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Mpar,scrap = Nassy,scrap mpar,assy 
 
where 
 
Mpar,scrap = Particulate mass on scrap, kg 
 
mpar,assy = Mass of particulate per assembly, kg 
 
 
The mass of particulate per assembly in a scrap basket is determined by judgement. 
 
5.  Particulate on Fuel.  Similarly, particulate may be found on the failed area and locally underneath 
adjacent cladding on fuel assemblies in fuel baskets, and the total mass is: 
 
Mpar,fuel  = Nassy,fuel mpar,assy 
 
The mass of particulate per assembly in a fuel basket is determined by judgement. 
 
6.  Generated Particulate on Scrap.  Particulate can be generated by oxidation after the MCO is loaded, 
and prior to shipment from CVD to staging, and it is possible that some portion of this particulate may 
chemically bind with free water or its vapor.  The mass of generated particulate is found using the 
reaction rates and time information described above in Sections 4.3 and 4.4: 
 
Mgen,scrap = F Aox,scrap (270/32) Σ  Ki ti 
where 
 
Mgen,scrap = Mass of generated particulate, scrap 
 
F = Rate law multiplier. 
 
 
Ki = Reaction rate constant, mg U/cm2 hr 
 
ti  = Time interval, hr 
 
The rate law multiplier is chosen as described in Section 5.3. 
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7. Generated Particulate on Fuel. Particulate generated in fuel baskets is similarly 
found by: 
 
Mgen,fuel  = F Aox,fuel (270/32) S Ki ti. 
 
5.3  Expert Judgment of Parameter Values 
Low, best-estimate, and bounding values are described here for the parameters listed in the preceding 
equations.  Three values are chosen because: (1) By considering more than just a bounding value, experts 
are forced to think about realistic expectations and variability in the quantities and therefore the estimates 
are perceived to be more physically based; (2) The reason for selection of the bounding value is better 
understood in relation to choice of the best estimate: (3) It is easier for persons using this work to 
understand these estimates than to intuitively grasp the meaning of more complete probability density 
functions (pdf's); and (4) It is perceived that pdf's with greater detail are simple not justified by the data.  
Definition of these values are: 
 
Low:  The contents of an MCO could occasionally be characterized by this value. 
 
Best-estimate:  The contents of an MCO are well-represented by this value, although there is 
expected to be local variation within an MCO. 
 
Bounding:  The contents of an MCO are not reasonably expected to exceed a particulate quantity 
derived by using the bounding parameter value.  Locally some fuel or scrap could have parameter 
values higher than given by the bounding value, but it would be unreasonable and inappropriate to 
assign such a value to calculate the contents of an entire MCO. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 5-1. SELECTION OF PARAMETER VALUES 
 
Mass per unit area of layer, 
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                              (m/A layer) Mg/cm2 
Bounding 10  The clear or white layer found on cladding in some K- 
  mg/cm2 West canisters is about an order of magnitude thicker 
  than that of the grey layer found on other cladding 
  surfaces.  The chosen value bounds the largest 
  observation, 8 mg/cm2 [Pitner, 1997]. 
 
Best-est. 0.6 Most fuel elements have the grey layer with an 
.       mg/cm2 estimated mass per area of 0.55 mg/cm2 
 
[Marschman and Abrefah, 1997]. 
 
Low 0.6 No reason and little consequence to selecting different 
mg/cm2 
low value than the best-estimate. 
 
  Oxidation area of scrap, 
  Aox,scrap  cm2 
Bounding               60,000      cm 2            From [Duncan, 1997]  
Best-est.     30,000      cm 2  Selected as one half of bounding. 
Low    10,000     cm 2  Scrap can consist of damaged assemblies with few "fine"  
            fragments by its definition. 
 Oxidation area of fuel, 
  Aox,fuel        cm2 
 
Bounding 70,000 cm 2 From [Duncan, 1997] 
 
Best-est. 3000 cm2 From [Duncan, 1997] 
Low 1000 cm2 Arbitrarily chosen to be lower than the best-estimate; 
   the actual value used here is not significant: 
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Density of oxide layer, 
 
 
 ρ layer  g / cm3 
 
All  10     g/cm3 Approximate density of uranium dioxide; these 
oxide layers have lower than theoretical density.  Hydrated 
layers would have a theoretical density half this value, but this 
can be considered explicitly for water content evaluations. 
 
Thickness of oxide layer, m 
       δ layer 
Bounding 16  µm Equal to the largest observed thickness for an oxide 
   layer in the process of-sloughing off [Abrefah et al, 
   1996] after simulated conditioning; greater than the 
. largest reported value of 3 µm for fuel actually in 
the K basins [Abrefah et al, 1997]. It is well known 
that the layer tends to slough off due to the factor of 
two density ratio between oxide and metal, leading to 
the linear oxidation rate law. 
Best-est. 3 µm Reported observation [Abrefah et al, 1997]. 
Low 3 µm No compelling reason to consider a lower value. 
 
  Mass of particulate per assembly in scrap basket, g 
 
  M par,assy 
Bounding 200 g An order of magnitude greater than the largest  observed 
particulate mass on an element, 20 g [Pitner, 1997c]; the 
particular assembly selected was among the worst observed.  
The value is about 1 % of the mass of an assembly and it is 
deemed incredible that such a mass of particles would survive 
cleaning. The value is equivalent to a particle layer of about 1 
mm if 10% of the assembly area were damaged, indicating 
that cladding would have to be badly deformed to retain such 
particles, lending credence to the cleaning assumption. This 
value accounts for contributions of  both inner and outer 
elements because it is so large,  and the damage fraction of 
inner elements is small. 
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Best-est. 20 g This is the worst measured value, taken from an  element 
destined for a scrap basket, so it is at least representative of 
scrap. Most inners are undamaged,  so using the worst 
measured value for an outer  element therefore accounts for 
contributions from inners 
 
Low 6 g  Lowest measured value.  
Mass of particulate per assembly in fuel basket, g 
     mpar,assy 
 
Bounding 20 g Fuel cannot look worse than scrap, so a best-estimate 
  value for scrap must bound that for fuel, and as above 
  the value for an element is appropriately extended to 
  cover an assembly: 
 
Best-est. 7.6 g 38 % of fuel elements are damaged, hence 38 % is 
  applied to the bounding figure to create a best 
  estimate. 
 
Low 1.3 g Most fuel assemblies are undamaged.  An MCO with 
  one canister pair containing damaged fuel would have 
  a value 141216, or 6.5% of the bounding figure.  The 
  value could well be zero, but is not considered 
  important. 
 
Reaction rate law multiplier (dimensionless) 
Bounding 10 Value from SNF Databook [Duncan, 1997]. 
Best-est. 3 Based on surface roughness [Johnson and Pitner, 
  1995] . 
Low 3 K-Basins fuel judged more reactive than fresh metal. 
 
 
5.4 Resulting Particulate Mass Values 
 
Generated particulate values are evaluated in Table 5-2, and other values given in Table 5-1 are 
employed in equations developed above as shown in Table 5-3. Results are rounded to yield the overall 
values summarized in Table 5-4. Note that in some cases, products of judged parameters are used. In 
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these cases, for simplicity, values at the same level are consistently carried through to yield the table 
result. This means that the frequency associated with the bounding value in the table is less than that 
associated with the input parameters, and in such cases the bounding values are more conservative than 
intended. 
 
TABLE 5-2. CALCULATION OF GENERATED PARTICULATE PER UNIT AREA, UNIT RATE 
LAW FACTOR. 
 
OPERATION       TEMPERATURE DURATION          GENERATED SPECIFIC 
  MASS 
                                   (Celsius) (hours)                  micrograms/cm2 
                                With 02        Without 02 
 
Queuing & Loading  10 720  153.6  3092. 
Transfer to CVD  10      4      0.85         17.2 
Connection  10    17.3     3.7         74.3 
Drying + Test  50    25.6    n/a   2914. 
Shipping Test  75    14.5    n/a 10047. 
Loading  25      4.5    n/a          60.9 
 
TOTAL - 2 Cycles      26140 29170 
 
TABLE 5-3.  CALCULATION OF PARTICULATE MASS VALUES 
 
 
 
 
1. Cladding Surface Film, Scrap 
 
Bounding: 3150 cm2/assy * 37.1 assy * 10-5 kg/cm2 = 1.2 kg 
Best-Est: 3150 cm2/assy * 37.1 assy * 6*10-7 kg/cm2 = 0.1 kg 
Low: 3150 cm2/assy * 37.1 assy * 6* 10-7 kg/cm2 = 0.1 kg 
 
2. Cladding Surface Film, Fuel 
 
Bounding: 3150 cm2/assy * 216 assy * 10-5 kg/cm2 = 6.4 kg 
Best-Est: 3150 cm2/assy * 216 assy * 6*10-7 kg/cm2 = 0.5 kg 
Low: 3150 cm2/assy * 216 assy * 6*10-7 kg/cm2 = 0.5 kg 
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3. Oxide Film, Scrap 
 
Bounding: 60,000 cm2 * 16* 10-4 cm * 0.01 kg/cm3 = 0.96 kg 
Best-Est: 30,000 cm2 * 3*10-4 cm * 0.01 kg/cm3 = 0.09 kg 
Low: 10,000 cm2 * 3*10-4 cm * 0.01 kg/cm3 = 0.03 kg 
 
4. Oxide Film, Fuel 
 
Bounding: 70,000 cm2 * 16*10-4 cm * 0.01 kg/cm3 = 1.12 kg 
Best-Est: 3000 cm2 * 3 * 10-4 cm * 0.01 kg/cm3 = 0.009 kg 
Low: 1000 cm2 * 3*10-4 cm * 0.01 kg/cm3 = 0.003 kg 
 
5. Particulate on Scrap 
 
Bounding: 0.2 kg/assy * 37.1 assy = 7.4 kg 
Best-Est.: 0.02 kg/assy * 37.1 assy = 0.74 kg 
Low: 0.006 kg/assy * 37.1 assy = 0.22 kg 
 
6. Particulate on Fuel 
 
   Bounding:  0.02 kg/assy * 216 assy = 4.32 kg 
   Best-Est:  0.0076 kg/assy * 216 assy = 1.64 kg 
   Low:  0.0013 kg/assy * 216 assy = 0.28 kg 
 
 
 
 
7. Generated Particulate, Scrap  
 
Bounding:  29.17*10-6 kg/cm2 * 100,000 cm2 * 10 multiplier = 29.17 kg 
Best-Est.:  29.17*10-6 kg/cm2 * 50,000 cm2 * 3 multiplier = 4.37 kg 
Low:  29.17*10-6 kg/cm2 * 10,000 cm2 * 3 multiplier = 0.875 kg 
 
 
8. Generated Particulate, Fuel 
 
Bounding:   29.17*10-6 kg/cm2 * 30,000 cm2 * 10 multiplier = 8.75 kg 
Best-Est.:   29.17*10-6 kg/cm2 *    3000 cm2 * 3 multiplier =   0.263 kg 
Low:   29.17*10-6 kg/cm2 *    1000 cm2 * 3 multiplier =   0.087 kg 
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TABLE 5-4. SUMMARY OF DERIVED PARTICULATE MASS VALUES (All values in kg) 
SOURCE BOUNDING       BEST-ESTIMATE       LOW 
1. Cladding surface film scrap 6.4      0.4              0.4 
2. Cladding surface film fuel 1.2      0.1.              0.1 
3. Oxide film, scrap 0.96      0.09              0.03 
4. Oxide film, fuel 1.12      0.009           < 0.003 
5. Particulate on scrap 7.4        0.74              0.22 
6. Particulate on fuel 4.32       1.64           < 0.28 
7. Generated particulate, scrap               29.2       4.4              0.9 
8. Generated particulate, fuel 8.75       0.263           < 0.087 
TOTAL                                                   59.75       7.7              2.02 
ROUNDED TOTAL                               60       8              2 
 
5.5 Remarks on Use of Particulate Inventory Values 
 
Values in the above table should be used with awareness of their source. 
 
With respect to MCO pressurization after CVD, the water content of each table entry must be 
separately evaluated.  The bounding cladding layer composition is likely to be aluminum hydroxide, 
while that of the grey layer is uranium peroxide tetrahydrate.  The density used for the oxide layer is that 
of the oxide in the table above, but if this layer is assumed hydrated; then half the value should be used.  
The great majority of the generated particulate simply cannot be hydrated because it is generated in an 
oxygen-free environment.  
With respect to particulate available for entrainment from an MCO, it is likely that little of the 
loaded inventory is entrainable, but generated particulate implies sloughing of the oxide layer and 
therefore this contribution is likely to be entrainable. 
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Appendix D 
Excerpted Abstracts and Summaries from Various Criticality 
Safety Analyses for N Reactor Fuels  
The following sections capture either abstract and/or summary information of previous criticality 
analyses done with N Reactor fuels in various storage and package configurations. 
D-1 Criticality Safety Evaluation of Irradiated N Reactor MK IA and 
Mk IV Fuel in Unconstrained Mark I and Mark II Fuel Canisters  
(WHC-SD-NR-CSER-009, Rev 0), 1993  
The analysis examined the technical details covering the safety classification of irradiated 
fuel canister storage racks in the 100K area irradiated fuel storage basins.  Computer calculations 
showed that, for all credible off-normal situations, the criticality safety limit (keff + 2δ < 0.98) is not 
violated due to the absence of fuel storage racks and the complete loss of spacing control alone.  
The following findings with MCNP code calculations were summarized as follows: 
 If the racks are removed and canister stay in place, no reactivity change is observed. 
 If canisters are moved together, reactivity increases.  
- For MKIV and MKIA assemblies in stainless steel canisters or aluminum canisters, with 
or without uranium oxide buildup, the criticality limit (keff + 2δ < 0.98) is not exceeded 
 If canisters are broken apart and close packed in a hexagonal geometry, the reactivity increases. 
- For MKIV and MKIA fuel assemblies in stainless steel canisters, and MKIV in aluminum 
canisters, this does not exceed the criticality limit (keff + 2δ < 0.98)/ 
- For MKIA fuel in aluminum canisters, this exceeds the criticality limit (keff + 2δ < 0.98).  
Because loss of canister integrity is also necessary before the criticality limit is violated, 
the complete loss of spacing control by itself does not violate the criticality safety limit. 
 If canisters are tipped, the keff is less than for standing canisters.  The tipped configuration is 
critically safe for both types of fuel and both canister materials 
 Single canister fuel spill off-normal assumed fuel elements around existing canisters.  The 
calculations for spilling all the fuel out of a single canister indicate the following: 
- For MKIV and MKIA fuel in stainless steel or aluminum canisters, the criticality limit 
(keff + 2δ < 0.98) is not exceeded under any condition. 
 Multiple canister fuel spill off-normal assumed one canister of fuel elements around each 
existing canister.  The calculations for a large number of canister drops indicate the following: 
- For MKIV fuel in stainless steel or aluminum canisters, the criticality limit (keff + 2δ < 
0.98) is not exceeded. 
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- MKIA fuel without storage racks in stainless steel or aluminum canisters will exceed the 
criticality limit (keff + 2δ < 0.98).  Because multiple fuel canister spills are also necessary 
before the criticality limit is violated, the complete loss of spacing control by itself does 
not violate the criticality safety limit. 
D-2 Use of a Keff Subcritical Limit of 0.98 (WHC-SD-SQA-CSA-20330, 
Rev. 0, 1991) 
This report addressed Audit Finding No. CS.2-1 by Tiger Team for Westinghouse Hanford 
Facilities.  A review is provided of the use of a subcritical limit on keff of 0.98 in operations with 
lowly enriched uranium.  This limit is used when directly relatable experimental critical mass 
data is available which can be extrapolated to specific situations using a validated computational 
technique. 
Use of a subcritical limit of 0.98 for fuel handling and storage limits, based upon individual, 
isolated batches of N Reactor fuel, is found to be justified.  Although use of a subcritical limit of 
0.98 was specifically justified in the analysis of the PUREX dissolve, based upon the criteria in 
effect at that time, this results in less conservative limits than those normally used for processing.  
It is recommended that PUREX dissolver limits be reestablished using a subcritical limit of 0.95. 
 
D-3 K Basin Criticality Evaluation for Irradiated Fuel Canisters in 
Sludge (WHC-SD-NR-CSER-001, Rev. 0, 1992) 
The criticality evaluations consider a series of accident scenarios in the KE basin (uranium 
enrichment of 0.95 Wt% or less) with various accumulations of sludge.  The sludge is due to fuel 
oxidation of damaged fuel, fuel segregation activities, and proposed fuel repackaging. 
Basin sludge or repackaging sludge was modeled as wet UO2 powder with a density between 1 
and about 6 g/cm3 UO2.  Wet UO2 powder was also imbedded with 3.175 cm (1.25-in.) diameter 
uranium metal rods to simulate broken fuel pieces in the most reactive geometry.  Different 
scenarios considered the UO2 around or underneath MKIV fuel encapsulation canisters, and the 
uranium metal rodded or unrodded UO2 powder inside and/or outside fuel encapsulation 
canisters.  
The analyses were performed with the WIMS-E and MCNP codes.  Some results from these 
calculations are: 
 The minimum slab (4 g/cm3 with imbedded uranium metal rods) thickness is 125.36 cm 
(49.35-iches) for keff of 0.98 as calculated by WIMS-E. 
 Approximately a 90 mk reduction in k∞ is due to the use of stainless steel fuel encapsulation 
canisters as compared to the use of aluminum fuel encapsulation canisters. 
 Canisters containing MKIV fuel with water moderation were more reactive than canister 
containing wet UO2 powder. 
 Canisters containing MKIV fuel with water moderation were only slightly less reactive (by 
18.55 + 5.71 mk for 3 g/cm3 UO2 with uranium rods) than canisters containing wet UO2 
DOE/SNF/REP-056 May 2000 
Rev. 0  Page 69 of 72
 
powder with uranium metal rods.  This canister containing rodded UO2 would contain 242.55 
kg (534.73 lbs) of uranium as compared to 333.56 kg (735.38 lbs) for MKIV fuel. 
 UO2 powder accumulation around canisters was more reactive than UO2 accumulation 
underneath the fuel encapsulation canisters. 
 UO2 powder accumulation of 3 g/cm3 UO2, and depths to 90 cm outside the fuel encapsulation 
canisters had MCNP calculated k∞ below 0.96 for both stainless steel and aluminum canisters. 
 Uranium metal rods in UO2 powder accumulation for 3 g/cm3 UO2 and depths to 90 cm outside 
the fuel encapsulation canisters had MCNP calculated k∞ below 0.98 for both stainless steel 
and aluminum canisters. 
In all cases with Mark II stainless steel canisters, the MCNP calculated k∞ remained safely below 
the criticality safety limit of keff = 0.98, even for fuel storage configurations in the KE Basins 
considering the presence of basin sludge modeled as wet UO2 powder with and without imbedded 
3.175 cm (1.25-in.) diameter uranium rods.  The potential for criticality is extremely remote. 
 
D-4 Criticality Safety Evaluation Report for Spent Nuclear Fuel 
Processing and Storage Facilities (HNF-SD-SNF-CSER-005, Rev. 
3, 1997)  [Note: the following information has been superceded 
by information contained in Ref. 12 (HNF-SD-SNF-CSER-005, 
Rev. 5B)] 
1.1 Introduction  Spent N Reactor fuel will be unloaded out of the existing canisters in Both K-
East and K-West Basins, and loaded into MCO containers with specially built baskets 
containing either 54 Mark IV or 48 Mark IA fuel assemblies.  MCO containers holding Mark 
IV fuel material will contain five tiers , or baskets, of fuel.  Because of the shorter length of 
all but eleven of the Mark IA fuel assemblies, MCO containers holding Mark IA fuel will 
contain six fuel baskets.  The Mark IA basket will have a central stainless steel insert of 6-
inch diameter, schedule 80 pipe to keep fuel material out of the central area of the basket for 
criticality control.  [NOTE: this central pipe has since been changed to a machined barstock 
component with a small bored hole to better exclude uranium; see Figure 4-6 and Ref. 4 for 
new design details]  This central insert excludes fuel elements and uranium scrap material 
from the central region of the basket, which is the region of highest neutron importance.  
Exclusion of scrap from this central region helps maintain keff less than the criticality criterion 
of 0.95. . .  
A fraction of the fuel inventory is damaged or corroded and does not closely resemble fuel 
elements.  This fissionable material will be referred to as scrap.  Scrap is material that came 
from stored, spent fuel assemblies, but also may contain corrosion products.  Scrap models 
used in this report are optimally configured and therefore bound all forms of N Reactor 
uranium scrap.  Because of the heterogeneous lattice effects, optimal scrap material is more 
reactive than is homogeneous sludge material; optimal scrap therefore bounds sludge and will 
be used in the analysis rather than sludge.  The older SPR with enrichments greater than 
natural will be loaded into scrap baskets in the top and bottom locations of the Mark IA 
MCOs.  The SPR fuel has enrichments up to that of N Reactor fuel, 1.25 wt%, and can be 
bounded by N Reactor fuel analyses. 
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1.2 Summary of Analysis Results  Criticality criteria require that the keff of the activities with 
(and storage of) the MCOs in the CSB, and activities with the MCOs in their transport casks 
outside the K basins, be less than 0.95 under both normal conditions and credible off-normal 
conditions, including uncertainties.  Existing criticality criteria for K Basins pool operations 
allow an upper limitation keff of 0.98.  Both these limits are nominal and actually lower when 
calculational uncertainties and code biases are considered.  Analysis has shown that the keff of 
the MCO/cask package under normal conditions will be below 0.95 by a substantial degree.  
Dry MCO/cask packages will have keffs less than 0.4.  MCOs flooded with water and loaded 
with intact N Reactor fuel assemblies will have keff less than 0.90. . . .  
The MCO container, holding dry fuel material, cannot be made critical under any conditions.  
The only criticality concern is with water moderation internal to the MCO.  Both Mark IV 
and Mark IA MCO containers are below keff = 0.89 for flooded intact fuel loadings.  Loading 
scrap in the top and bottom tiers with intact fuel in the other tiers has a keff  less than 0.90, 
which is the normally allowed arrangement of packing scrap in an MCO.  However, if the 
second basket is misplaced from the top to the second from the bottom, so that two scrap 
baskets occupy the bottom two tiers, the keff  increases to less that 0.91.  The 0.95 wt% scrap, 
when loaded into Mark IV scrap baskets, tends to be more limiting because of the absence of 
the safety class structure that excluded scrap from the center of the basket, as is the case when 
loading Mark IA scrap into Mark IA baskets, which contain the 6-inch stainless steel insert. 
The inside diameter of the MCO provides geometry control and ensures that keff is always 
less than 1.0.  Additional constraints and limits ensure that the keff is less than 0.95.  For 
accidents, two independent, concurrent, and highly unlikely incidents must occur before the 
keff is allowed to exceed 0.95.  This is the two contingency principle of criticality safety. 
The 100g drop is the limiting design basis accident (DBA). . . .A conservative packing 
fraction of 0.4 was used . . . a more realistic random packing fraction for uniform-size spheres 
has been shown to equal approximately 0.64 (Berryman 1983) . . . and would drive the 
system far less reactive than 0.40 . . . bottom plates of the baskets are assumed to lose their 
structural attachment to the central tubular insert, and the rubblized fuel and cladding filled 
baskets fall on top of one another . . . this limiting accident condition, keff at the upper 95% 
confidence level for the Mark IV loaded MCO is less the 0.94; this one result is the most 
limiting and requires closer attention to demonstrate compliance with criticality safety limits.  
. . . The drop accident is assumed to completely rubblize the fuel.  If this drop accident occurs 
during transport of the MCO container . . .when the MCO is fully flooded, the MCO could 
exceed the keff < 0.95 criterion for a transient phase during rebound . . .The drop accident 
must both agglomerate smaller fuel fragments, which result from the impact, into larger 
particles and disperse these particles into optimal spacing during the same rebound.  This 
scenario is considered incredible.  The calculated keff for this scenario does not exceed 0.98.  
The end-state does satisfy keff < 0.95 once the rubble has compacted down to a packing 
fraction of 0.40 due to gravity from fuel crushing . . . . 
Normally fuel types are to be segregated by enrichment.  However, placing Mark IV fuel 
assemblies, components, and scrap together in baskets designed for Mark IA fuel (with 
central criticality-control insert) is allowed, because of the lower unit reactivity of Mark IV 
fuel. 
[Note: any limiting conditions identified in CSER-005, Rev. 3 have been supplanted by the 
following assumptions taken from HNF-SD-SNF-CSER-005, Rev 5B.] 
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Because of their length, the twelve 26.1-in. long Mark 1A assemblies in the K West Basis will be 
loaded into Mark IV baskets [Ref. 13].  Otherwise, fuel and scrap with an enrichment greater than 
0.95 wt% shall only be loaded into Mark 1A fuel and scrap baskets. 
Conservatisms in the Analysis 
 Many conservatisms have been built into this analysis. 
• The safety limit is 0.95.  The margin of safety provided by using the 0.95 limit for the low-
enriched uranium metal fuel in the K Basins is far greater than the margin of safety provided 
by using the same limit for the greater enrichment of commercial fuels of which the limit is 
based. 
• It is assumed that the baskets completely fail in an accident. 
• The reduction of reactivity resulting from fuel burnup, fission products in the spent fuel, and 
other nonfissionable material introduced as contaminants in the K Basin sludge and fuel debris, 
is not included in the analyses (although burnup effects are discussed in Appendix D). 
• The scrap is completely optimized (i.e. optimum particle size and optimum water-to-fuel ratio). 
• The fuel rubblizes to optimized scrap in a drop accident even though this is judged to be 
incredible. 
• The most reactive loading configuration of the MCO fuel baskets is used. 
 
Analysis Assumptions 
 The analyses performed to evaluate the acceptability of the normal and accident conditions for the 
MCO were based on the assumptions defined below. 
Assumption 1 The MCO is either always in a cask, loaded into the MCO handling 
machine (MHM), in the CSB storage tubes, or in the CSB sampling/weld 
station when flooded with water.  Note that flooded MCOs in the MHM, 
CSB storage tubes, or CSB sampling/weld station were analyzed as a 
contingency. 
Assumption 2 Mark IA fuel or scrap is normally loaded into Mark IA fuel or scrap 
baskets, which have the center post that serves as a criticality feature to 
exclude fissile material from the center of the basket.  The only 
exceptions to this are for the 26.1-in. long Mark IA fuel assemblies, 
which will be loaded into Mark IV baskets. 
Assumption 3 The credible misloading scenario for Mark IA fuel being inadvertently 
loaded into a Mark IV basket is 14 Mark IA fuel assemblies.  For scrap 
this is equivalent to 155 kg, the mass of 14 Mark IA outer elements, with 
an enrichment of 1.25 wt% 235U. 
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Assumption 4 Following the drop of a Mark IV MCO, the basket base plates remain 
intact.  These plates are not safety class; however their mass is conserved 
in the models. 
Assumption 5 The misload for Mark IV scrap baskets includes the center pipe. 
